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SUMMARY
The advent of information services introduces many advantages, for example,
in trade, production and services. While making important decisions today, people
increasingly rely on the information gleaned from such services. Presumably, as such,
information from these services has become a target of manipulation.
During the past decade, we have already observed many forms of information
manipulation that misrepresents or alters reality. Some popular manipulation – we
have ever witnessed on the Internet – include using black hat SEO techniques to
drive up the ranking of a disreputable business, creating disinformative campaigns to
conceal political dissidence, and employing less-than-honest product assessments to
paint a rosy picture for inferior wares. Today, emerging web services and technologies
greatly facilitated and enhanced people’s lives. However, these innovations also enrich
the arsenal of manipulators.
The sheer amount of online information available today can threaten to overwhelm
any user. To help ensure that users do not drown in the flood of information, modern
web services are increasing relying upon personalization to improve the quality of
their customers’ experience. At the same time, personalization also represents new
ammunition for all manipulators seeking to steer user eyeballs, regardless of their
intents. In this thesis, I demonstrate a new unforeseen manipulation that exploits
the mechanisms and algorithms underlying personalization. To undermine the effect
of such manipulation, this thesis also introduces two effective, efficient mitigation
strategies that can be applied to a number of personalization services.
In addition to aforementioned personalization, increasingly prevalent browser ex-
tensions augment the ability to distort online information. In this thesis, I unveil an
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overlooked but widespread manipulation phenomenon in which miscreants abuse the
privilege of browser extensions to tamper with the online advertisement presented to
users. Considering that online advertising business is one of the primary approaches
used to monetize free online services and applications available to users, and reckless
ad manipulation may significantly roil advertising ecosystem, this thesis scrutinizes
the potential effect of ad manipulation, and develops a technical approach to detect
those browser extensions that falsify the ads presented to end users.
Although the thesis merely discusses several manipulation examples in the context
of the Internet, the findings and technologies presented in this thesis introduce broad
impacts. First, my research findings raise Internet users’ awareness about pervasive
information manipulation. Second, the proposed technologies help users alleviate the
pernicious effects of existing information manipulation. Finally, accompanying the
findings and technologies is publicly available open-source software and tools that will






Information services permeated almost every aspect of people’s lives. With the help
of information services, we share information, establish relationships, exchange ideas,
and even conduct business on the Internet. The wide adoption of these information
services has also attracted malicious parties who seek to use the services as entry
points to gain unlawful benefits. Information manipulation is a new emerging frontier
in cyber security. It denotes all attempts by adversaries to distort information with
the goal to influence opinion, thought, or action.
Information manipulation can take many shapes and forms. Indeed, we have
already observed many forms of information manipulation on the Internet. For ex-
ample, scammers have long used cloaking as a technique to drive up search engine
rankings of disreputable businesses or products, leading users to make a poor eco-
nomic decision. Similarly, public relation companies leverage massive disinformation
campaigns to directly influence customer purchase decisions.
Unlike most traditional attacks, which typically aim to take control of compu-
tational resources or sensitive data, information manipulation targets human minds
and their ideas. Given an information service, manipulators can control informa-
tion presented to users in a variety of ways. As is shown in Figure 1, attackers can
manipulate the input data to an information service, in order to control the output
presented to users with the goal of influencing the users to make decisions and take
actions that benefit the attackers at the expense of the users. In addition, manipula-
tors can directly control what Internet content users are able to see and how they see
1
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Figure 1: The target of information manipulators: 1© the input data to the information
service, and 2© the output from the information service.
them in order to influence the users’ minds and actions. Left untackled, information
manipulation can result in serious consequences.
In this thesis, my work aims to counter information manipulation on the Internet.
In achieving this goal, I rely on the following approaches:
• identifying and understanding unforeseen information manipulation schemes;
• building infrastructure to quantify and evaluate the potential influence of infor-
mation manipulation;
• applying the resulting insights to the invention and design of mitigation ap-
proaches and
• building system prototype to overcome information manipulation.
More specifically, this thesis focuses on two types of unforeseen information ma-
nipulation. In one type of manipulation, manipulators control the input data to an
information service. To be more specific, attackers manipulate the personal data
that personalization systems rely upon and thus alter the output of these systems
in predictable ways. Another type of manipulation directly targets the output from
information services. In particular, attackers abuse the privilege of browser extension
to manipulate the advertisement presented to users. In this thesis, I quantify the
2
potential influence of both manipulation schemes. To mitigate the first type of ma-
nipulation, I built BobbleX, a client side tool that creates multiple user personas and
leverages sentiment analysis techniques to expose distorted or incomplete information.
In attempt to overcome the second type of manipulation, I developed Expector, a
system that automatically identifies browser extension with advertisement manipula-
tion activities. In the following sections, I summarize the main contributions of this
thesis in turn.
1.2 Pollution Attack: Manipulating Personal Input
Modern Web services routinely personalize content to appeal to the specific interests,
viewpoints, and contexts of individual users. Ideally, personalization allows sites
to highlight information uniquely relevant to each of their users, thereby increasing
user satisfaction—and, eventually, the service’s bottom line. Unfortunately, as I
demonstrate in Chapter 3, the personalization mechanisms currently employed by
popular services have not been hardened against attack. I show that third parties can
launch pollution attack that manipulates them to increase the visibility of arbitrary
content—whether it be a new YouTube video, unpopular product on Amazon, or
low-ranking website in Google search returns. I demonstrate that attackers can inject
information into individual users’ profiles on these services, thereby perturbing the
results of the services’ personalization algorithms. While the details of my exploits
are tailored to each service, the general approach is likely to apply quite broadly. By
demonstrating the attack against three popular Web services, I highlight a new class
of vulnerability, whereby an attacker can significantly affect a user’s experience for
that service without the user’s knowledge.
1.3 Mitigating Pollution Attack
Guided by the understanding of pollution attack, Chapter 4 introduces two mitiga-
tion strategies that aim to disclose information prejudices attributable to pollution
3
attack. These two strategies leverage sentiment analysis to raise users’ awareness
about information prejudices. Using different user personas to scrutinize the output
of an information service, one mitigation strategy can also facilitate users to identify
possibly invalid input data. I demonstrate these two strategies on Google personal-
ized search. In particular, I developed BobbleX, a client side tool that (1) allows users
to see how Google returns to them differ from the results that are returned to other
users; (2) raises users’ awareness about information prejudices hidden behind search
results; (3) facilitates users to identify invalid searches.
1.4 Mitigating Direct Information Manipulation
In Chapter 5, the thesis switches the gear to the second type of information ma-
nipulation. In particular, this chapter discusses browser extension that increasingly
abuses its privilege to manipulate the ad presented to users. I present Expector, a
system that automatically inspects and identifies browser extensions that abuse their
privileges and inject ads in webpages that a user browses. Expector is designed to be
scalable and accurate. I evaluate Expector across more than 18,000 Chrome browser
extensions and are successfully able to detect 292 extensions that inject ads with a 4%
false positive and 3% false negative rate. I present a detailed study of the ad injecting
practices and find that many of these extensions violate the store policies, participate
in fraudulent activities, and degrade their users’ trust. Finally, using HTTP and
DNS traces collected from large enterprises and ISP networks, I provide a detailed
operation and revenue estimation of the ad networks that participate in delivering




In the past decades, there are many information manipulation attacks. Though shar-
ing the same goal with the aforementioned manipulation, they take different measures,
such as controlling publicly available information or its access. In this chapter, we
summarize these information manipulation attacks and analyze their detection or
mitigation mechanisms.
2.1 Controlling Publicly Available Data
Information services typically gather and process publicly available information across
the Internet. For example, search engines hunt for text in publicly accessible docu-
ments offered by web servers, and rank these documents that match a given search
string using various ranking algorithms. Blackhat SEO (bSEO) is one typical ma-
nipulation attack, which targets publicly accessible documents and influences their
presentation to searchers. More specifically, it utilizes a huge amount of spam web-
pages to promote the ranking of certain target webpages in search engines [48, 58].
Another manipulation attack is opinion spamming. In particular, manipulators post
a large number of fake comments and reviews on publicly available platforms with
the goal of altering users’ beliefs and influencing their decisions [51].
To detect the manipulation attacks above, the most common solution is to harness
graph-based methods and relational modeling to identify manipulated information.
In the case of pinpointing spam webpages [27,33,67,98,99], one typical approach is to
analyze link dependencies among webpages. Regarding weeding out phony reviews,
technical endeavors [51, 55, 63, 64, 68, 69, 87] primarily focus on developing effective
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anomaly detection approaches by using complex relationships among reviewers, re-
views, and entities. The aforementioned personalization manipulation does not need a
massive spam campaign. Thus, techniques that address bSEO and opinion spamming
are unlikely to be effective against this new class of manipulation.
2.2 Controlling Data Access
In another form of information manipulation, manipulators compromise infrastruc-
tures underlying information services and thus control the access to information.
Internet censorship is such an attack [23, 93]. In particular, it controls what can be
accessed, published or viewed on the Internet. Internet censorship is typically carried
out by government for the purpose of suppressing politically incorrect information. In
some cases, individuals and organizations could also engage censorship for religious or
business reasons. In general, Internet censorship happens in the communication layer,
where manipulators block the access to certain information. A similar manipulation
attack is communication hijacking. Different from Internet censorship, manipulators
do not block content access but hijack and manipulate information as it propagates
to users. One typical example of such manipulation is to insert additional adver-
tisements on the webpages served to end users [88]. Another example is to remove
unwanted search results from a user’s set of results.
Past studies on mitigating these manipulation attacks focus on solutions that pro-
vide computational trust, e.g., establishing encrypted tunnels or proxies to circumvent
Internet censorship [45, 50, 60, 89, 90]. In personalization manipulation, manipulators
do not need to take the control of the infrastructure underlying information services.
Thus, techniques that provide computation trust are not applicable to the new prob-
lem space. In this thesis, I invent a new type of mechanism to provide behavioral
trust, i.e., a scheme that will ensure the content that a user receives satisfy the user’s
utility function or expectation.
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CHAPTER III
POLLUTION ATTACKS: MANIPULATING PERSONAL
INFORMATION
The economics of the Web ecosystem are all about clicks and eyeballs. The business
model of many Web services depends on advertisement: they charge for prime screen
real estate, and focus a great deal of effort on developing mechanisms that make sure
that the information displayed most prominently is likely to create revenue for the ser-
vice, either through a direct ad buy, commission, or, at the very least, improving the
user’s experience. Not surprisingly, malfeasants and upstanding business operators
alike have long sought to reverse engineer and exploit these mechanisms to cheaply
and effectively place their own content—whether it be items for sale, malicious con-
tent, or affiliate marketing schemes. Search engine optimization (SEO), which seeks
to impact the placement of individual Web pages in the results provided by search
engines, is perhaps the most widely understood example of this practice.
Modern Web services are increasingly relying upon personalization to improve
the quality of their customers’ experience. For example, popular websites tailor their
front pages based upon a user’s previous browsing history at the site; video-sharing
websites such as YouTube recommend related videos based upon a user’s watch his-
tory; shopping portals like Amazon make suggestions based upon a user’s history at
the site; and search engines such as Google return customized results based upon a
wide variety of user-specific factors. As the Web becomes increasingly personal, the
effectiveness of broad-brush techniques like SEO will wane. In its place will rise a new
class of schemes and outright attacks that exploit the mechanisms and algorithms un-
derlying this personalization. In other words, personalization represents a new attack
7
surface for all those seeking to steer user eyeballs, regardless of their intents.
In this chapter, we demonstrate that contemporary personalization mechanisms
are vulnerable to exploit. In particular, we show that YouTube, Amazon, and Google
are all vulnerable to the same general form of cross-site scripting attack that allows
third-party websites to alter the customized content the services return to users who
have visited a page containing the exploit. We do not claim that this attack is either
the most powerful—although we demonstrate it is quite effective—broadly applicable,
or hard to defeat. Rather, we offer it as a first example of an entire class of attacks
that we believe will soon—if they are not already—be launched against the relatively
unprotected underbelly of personalization services.
Our attack exploits the fact that a service employing personalization incorpo-
rates a user’s past history (including browsing, searching and purchasing activities)
to customize the content that it presents to the user. Importantly, many services
with personalized content log their users’ Web activities whenever they are logged in
regardless of the site they are currently visiting; other services track user activities
on the site even if the user is logged out (e.g., through a session cookie). We use
both mechanisms to pollute users’ service profiles, thereby impacting the customized
content returned to the users in predictable ways. Given the increasing portfolio of
services provided by major players like Google and Amazon, it seems reasonable to
expect that a large fraction of users will either be directly using the service or at least
logged in while browsing elsewhere the Web.
We show that our class of attack, which we call pollution attacks, can be extremely
effective on three popular platforms: YouTube, Google, and Amazon. A distinguish-
ing feature of our attack is that it does not exploit any vulnerability in the user’s
Web browser. Rather, it leverages these services’ own personalization mechanisms to
alter the user’s experience. While our particular implementation employs a form of
cross-site request forgery (XSRF) [22], other mechanisms are possible.
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The ability to trivially launch such an attack is especially worrisome because it
indicates the current approach to Web security is ill-equipped to address the vulner-
abilities likely to exist in personalization mechanisms. In particular, today’s Web
browsers prevent exploits like cross-site scripting and request forging by enforcing
boundaries between domains though “same origin” policies. The limitations of these
approaches are well known, but our attack represents a class of exploits that cannot
be stopped by client-side enforcement: in an attempt to increase the footprint of its
personalization engine (e.g., Google recording search queries that a user enters on
a third-party page), a service with personalized services is providing the cross-site
vector itself. Hence, only the service can defend itself from such attacks on its per-
sonalization. Moreover, enforcing isolation between independent Web sessions seems
antithetical to the goal of personalization, which seeks to increase the amount of
information upon which to base customization attempts.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We describe pollution attacks against three platforms—YouTube, Google, and
Amazon—that allow a third party to alter the personalized content these ser-
vices present to users who previously visited a Web page containing the exploit.
• We study the effectiveness of our attack on each of these platforms and demon-
strate that it (1) can increase the visibility of almost any YouTube channel; (2)
dramatically increase the ranking of most websites in the short term, and even
have lasting impacts on the personalized rankings of a smaller set of sites, and
(3) cause Amazon to recommend reasonably popular products of the attacker’s
choosing.
• More broadly, our attack and its effectiveness illustrates the importance of se-
curing personalization mechanisms in general. We discuss a number of implica-
tions of our study and the ways in which websites can attempt to avoid similar
vulnerabilities in the future.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a general overview
of pollution attacks on personalized services. Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 introduce
specific attacks that can be launched against YouTube, Google, and Amazon, respec-
tively, and report on our success. We discuss limitations of our work and possible
defenses in Section 3.5 before concluding in Section 5.7.
3.1 Overview and Attack Model
In this section, we present a brief overview of personalization as it is employed by
popular Web services. We then present a model of pollution attacks, which we apply
to three different scenarios later in the chapter – YouTube, Amazon, and Google.
3.1.1 Personalization
Online services are increasingly using personalization to deliver information to users
that is tailored to their interests and preferences. Personalization potentially creates
a situation where both the service provider and the user benefit: the user sees content
that more closely matches preferences, and the service provider presents products that
the user is more likely to purchase (or links that the user is more likely to click on),
thus potentially resulting in higher revenues for the service provider.
The main instrument that a service provider can use to affect the content that a
user sees is modifying the choice set, the set of results that a user sees on a particular
screen in response to a particular query. The size of a choice set differs for different
services. For example, YouTube shows the user anywhere from 12–40 videos; Amazon
may show the user up to five sets of recommended products; Google’s initial search
results page shows the top ten results. Figure 2 shows several examples of choice sets
on different sites.
A service’s personalization algorithm affects the user’s choice set, in response to a
query. The choice set that a personalization algorithm produces depends on a user
query, as well as a number of auxiliary factors, including the universe of all possible
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content and the user’s search history. Previous work has claimed that many factors,
ranging from geography to time of day, may affect the choice set that a user sees.
For the purposes of the attacks in this chapter, we focus on how changes to a user’s
search history can affect the choice set, holding other factors fixed. In particular,
we focus how an attacker can pollute the user’s search history by generating false
clicks through cross-site request forgery (XSRF). We describe these attacks in the
next section.
3.1.2 Pollution Attacks
The objective of a pollution attack is to affect a user’s choice set, given a particular
input. In some cases, a user’s choice set appears before the user enters any input (e.g.,
upon an initial visit to the page). In this case, the attacker’s goal may be to affect
a default choice set. Figure 3 shows an overview of the attacker’s goal: in summary,
the attacker aims to affect the resulting choice set by altering the user’s history with
false clicks, using cross-site request forgery as the attack vector. This attack requires
three steps:
1. Model the service’s personalization algorithm. We assume that the attacker
has some ability to model the personalization algorithm that the site uses to
affect the user’s choice set. In particular, the attacker must have some idea
of how the user’s past history affects the user’s choice set. This information
is often available in published white papers, but in some cases it may require
experimentation.
2. Create a “seed” with which to pollute the user’s search history. Given some
knowledge of the personalization algorithm and a goal for how to affect the
choice set, the attacker must design the seed with which to affect the user’s
choice set. Depending on the service, the seed may be queries, clicks, pur-
chases, or any other activity that might go into the user’s search history. The
11
optimal seed is one that can maximally affect the user’s choice set with minimal
overhead.
3. Inject the seed with a vector of false clicks. To pollute a user’s history, in
most cases we require that the user be signed in to the site. (For some services,
pollution can take place even when the user is not signed in.) Then, the attacker
can use a mechanism to make it appear as though the user is taking action on
the Web site for a particular service (e.g., clicking on links) using a particular
attack vector.
In the following sections, we explore how an attacker can apply this same procedure to
attack the personalization algorithms of three different services: YouTube, Amazon,
and Google search.
3.2 Pollution Attacks on YouTube
In this section, we demonstrate our attack on YouTube. Following the aforementioned
attack steps, we first understand how YouTube uses the watch history of a YouTube
user account to recommend videos by reviewing the literature [38]. Second, we discuss
how to prepare seed data (seed videos) to promote target data (target videos belonging
to a specific channel). Third, we introduce how to inject the seed videos to a YouTube
user account. Finally, we design experiments and validate the effectiveness of our
attack.
3.2.1 YouTube Personalization
YouTube constructs a personalized list of recommended videos based upon the videos
a user has previously viewed [38]. In particular, YouTube attempts to identify the
subset of previously viewed videos that the user enjoyed by considering only those
videos that the user watched for a long period of time. Typically, YouTube rec-
ommends videos that other users with similar watching histories have also enjoyed.
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In particular, YouTube tracks the co-visitation relationship between pairs of videos;
namely, how likely is a user who watched and enjoyed (i.e., watched a substantial
portion of) video X to watch and enjoy video Y . In general, there may be more
videos with co-visitation relationships (which we term “recommendable”) to a user’s
history than there is display area, so YouTube selects those recommendable videos
with high rankings. YouTube will not, however, recommend a video the user has
already watched.
YouTube displays recommended videos in the suggestion list placed alongside with
a playing video (e.g., Figure 6) and in the main portion of the screen at the end of a
video (Figure 2(a)). A suggestion list appearing alongside a video typically contains
20–40 suggested videos, 2 of which are recommended based upon personalization. At
the end of a video, YouTube shows an even more concise version of the suggestion
list containing only 12 of the video from the full list; these may or may not contain
the personal recommendations.
3.2.2 Preparing Seed Videos
YouTube organizes videos into channels, where each channel corresponds to the set
of uploads from a particular user. In our attack, we seek to promote a set of target
videos (ΩT ), all belonging to the same YouTube channel, C. To do so, we will use
an additional set of seed videos (ΩS) that have a co-visitation relationship with the
target videos. By polluting a user’s watch history with videos in ΩS, we can coerce
YouTube into recommending videos in ΩT . There are two ways to obtain ΩS: we can
identify videos with pre-existing co-visitation relationships to the target videos, or we
can create the relationships ourselves.
Existing Relationships. In the simplest version of the attack, the attacker iden-
tifies existing videos to use as the seed set. For example, given a target video set
(ΩT ) belonging to channel C, the attacker could consider all the other videos in the
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channel, C − ΩT , as candidate seeds. For every candidate video, the attacker checks
which videos YouTube recommends when a fresh YouTube account (a YouTube ac-
count with no history) watches it. Note that YouTube allows its users to view their
recommended videos at http://www.youtube.com/feed/recommended. If the can-
didate video triggers YouTube to recommend a video in ΩT , then the attacker adds
the injected video to seed video set ΩS.
In general, this process can be used to identify seed videos for every target video in
ΩT . The attacker is not yet ready, however, to launch the attack because a YouTube
video in ΩS may trigger YouTube to also recommend videos not in ΩT . To address
this issue, the attacker can simply add these unwanted videos to the seed video set
ΩS because YouTube does not recommend videos that the user has already watched.
(As we show later, the attacker will convince YouTube that the user watched, but did
not enjoy, these unwanted videos, so their inclusion in ΩS will not lead to additional
recommendations.)
Fabricating Relationships. For some videos, it may be difficult to identify a
seed set ΩS that recommends all of the elements of ΩT due to lack of co-visitation
relationships for some of the target elements. Instead, an attacker that is willing
to upload her own content to use as the seed set can simply create co-visitation
relationships between this content and the target set. In particular, an attacker
uploads a set of videos (Ω0) and establishes co-visitation relationships between Ω0
and ΩT through crowd-sourcing (e.g., Mechanical Turk or a botnet): YouTube visitors
need only watch a video in Ω0 followed by a video in ΩT . After a sufficient number
of viewing pairs (we show in Section 3.2.4.1 it doesn’t take many), the attacker can
use videos in Ω0 as the seed set.
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3.2.3 Injecting Seed Videos
To actually launch the attack and inject seed videos into a victim’s YouTube watch
history, an attacker can harness XSRF to forge the following two HTTP requests
for each video in the seed set: (1) http://www.youtube.com/user_watch?plid=
<value>&video_id=<value>, and (2) http://www.youtube.com/set_awesome?plid=
<value>&video_id=<value>, where plid and video_id correspond to the values
found in the source code of the seed video’s YouTube page. The first HTTP request
spoofs a request from the victim to start watching the seed video, and the second
convinces YouTube that the victim watched the video for a long period of time. Note
that both HTTP requests are required in order for videos in ΩS to trigger the recom-
mendation of videos in ΩT , but only the first HTTP request is needed to prevent the
recommendation of unwanted videos.
3.2.4 Experimental Design
We wish to evaluate the effectiveness of our attack both in controlled environments
and against real YouTube users. We start by validating the effectiveness of our
approach in the simplest scenario where our attack is launched to promote pre-existing
YouTube channels through existing co-visitation relationships. We then consider the
scenario where an attack seems to upload and promote content from her own channel.
Finally, we conduct a small-scale experiment to demonstrate the attack works against
a volunteer set of real YouTube users.
3.2.4.1 New Accounts
We first promote existing YouTube channels by launching our attack against victims
with fresh YouTube user accounts. Fresh YouTube user accounts allow us to confirm
the effectiveness of our approach in the absence of other, potentially countervailing
influences, i.e., other personalized recommendations based on a user’s existing history.
We begin by selecting 100 existing YouTube channels at random from among the
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list of the top 2,000 most-subscribed channels published by VidStatsX [86]. For each
of the selected YouTube channels, we randomly select 25 videos from the channel as
the target video set, used the method described in the previous section to identify a
seed video set, and then injected the seed videos to a fresh YouTube account.
Secondly, we consider promoting new content by creating our own YouTube chan-
nel and similarly attacking fresh YouTube accounts. Our YouTube channel contains
two 3-minute videos. We select one of the videos as a one-element target video set and
used the other as the seed set. We created a co-visitation relationship by embed both
videos on a Web page and recruiting volunteers to watch both videos sequentially.
We obtained 65 and 68 views by existing YouTube users for our seed and target video
respectively.
3.2.4.2 Existing Accounts
Finally, we study the effectiveness of our pollution attack against real YouTube user
accounts. We recruit 22 volunteers with extensive pre-existing YouTube watch his-
tories. In order to limit the inconvenience to our volunteers, we limit our study to
attempting to promote one moderately popular YouTube channel based upon existing
co-visitation relationships. We select a moderately popular account for two reasons:
first, a wildly popular channel is likely to be recommended anyway, so extracts lit-
tle benefit from our attack. Conversely, an entirely new channel requires a certain
amount of effort to establish the co-visitation relationships as described above and
we have limited volunteer resources.
Based on these parameters, we arbitrarily selecte channel OnlyyouHappycamp.
We believe this selection is a reasonable candidate to be promoted using our attack
due to the following reasons. First, compared to popular channels, most videos in
OnlyyouHappycamp have low view counts (about 2,000 view counts per video on
average) and the number of subscribers to the channel is a similarly modest 3,552.
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Both of these are easily achievable by an attacker at fairly low cost1. Second, most
videos in OnlyyouHappycamp are 22 minutes long, which makes them well suited
for promotion. As we explain in Section 3.2.5.1, the length of a target video plays
a significant role in its likelihood of being selected from among the recommendable
videos.
Similar to the experiments with new accounts, we randomly select 15 target videos
from channel OnlyyouHappycamp, identified a seed set, and injected the seed videos
into the volunteers’ YouTube accounts. After pollution, the volunteers are asked to
use their accounts to watch three videos of their choice and report the suggestion list
displaying alongside each of their three videos.
3.2.5 Evaluation
We evaluated effectiveness of our pollution attacks by logging in as the victim user
and viewing 114 representative videos2. We measure the effectiveness of our attack
in terms of promotion rate: the fraction of the 114 viewings when at least one of
the target videos was contained within the video suggestion list. Recall that the list
contains at most two personalized recommendations; we call it a success if one or
both of these videos are among the target set.
3.2.5.1 New Accounts
Our attacks are universally successful in promoting target videos from each of the 100
selected existing channels. In other words, each time we target a fresh account by
injecting seed videos targeting a particular channel, we observe the target videos in
the suggestion list for each of the 114 videos. Because these are fresh accounts, there
is no other history, so our targeted videos always occupy both of the personalized
1According to the prices in underground markets such as freelancer.com and fiverr.com,
40,000 view counts and 10,000 subscribers cost $15 and $30 US dollars, respectively.
2We actually attempted to view 150 videos drawn at random from a trace of YouTube usage at
our institution over the course of several months. Unfortunately 36 of the videos were no longer
available at the time of our experiment.
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recommendation slots.
In addition, we observe the the particular target videos shown in the suggestion
video list varies, even when we viewing the same video using the same victim YouTube
account. In other words, every target video has a chance to be promoted and shown
on the suggestion video list no matter which video a victim plays. Figure 4 shows
the frequency with which each of the 25 target videos for a representative channel,
lady16makeup. In an attempt to explain this variation, we compute (1) the Pearson
correlation between the showing frequencies and the lengths of the target videos for
each channel (ρt); (2) the Pearson correlation between the showing frequencies and the
view counts of these target videos for each channel (ρcnt). We find the average Pearson
correlation values are medium (ρt = 0.54) and moderate (ρcnt = 0.23), respectively.
This suggests that both the length and view count of a target video influence its
recommendation frequency, but the length of a target video is a more significant
factor.
Because screen real estate is precious, and users typically focus on the first few
items of a list, we report on the position within the suggested video lists that our
targeted videos occupy when they are promoted. We observe that the two target
videos are usually placed back-to-back on the suggestion list. Moreover, as shown
in Figure 5, YouTube usually places our target videos among the top few spots of a
victim’s suggestion list: In our tests with new accounts, the target videos are always
recommended and placed on the top 12, which means they also appear at the end of
viewed videos. This is particularly significant, as it implies that our target videos are
shown even if a victim finishes watching a YouTube video on a third-party Website
(which typically embeds only the view-screen portion of the YouTube page, and not
the full suggestion list).
Our attacks were similarly completely successful in promoting newly uploaded
content. As a control, we also signed in as non-polluted fresh YouTube accounts
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and, unsurprisingly, did not find any of our new content among the videos in the
suggestion list. In other words, the videos were recommended exclusively because of
our attacks; our experiments were sufficiently small that we did not lead YouTube
to conclude that our content was, in fact, universally popular. Figure 6 shows a
sample screenshot comparing the suggestion lists from a victim account and another,
non-exploited fresh account. Finally, while we omit the full distribution due to space
constraints, we find that one of our target videos occupies the top suggestion slot
while viewing 80 out of the 114 test videos.
3.2.5.2 Existing Accounts
Unsurprisingly, our attacks were somewhat less successful on real YouTube accounts.
14 out of the 22 volunteer YouTube users report that at least one of our target videos
from channel OnlyyouHappycamp appeared in the suggestion list during each of their
three video viewings, a 64% promotion rate.
To understand why we were able to exploit some accounts and not others, we asked
our volunteers to share their YouTube watch histories. Ten of our volunteers shared
their histories with us and allowed us to sign in to their YouTube accounts to conduct
a further study. The number of videos in the watch histories of the 10 volunteers
ranged from a few hundred to ten thousand. Figure 7 shows the relationship between
the number of watched videos in a watch history and the number of times that at
least one of our target videos is displayed along with a playing video. While there
appears to be an intuitive decreasing trend (i.e., the longer the history an account
has the more resistant it is to pollution), there are obvious outliers. For example, one
account with almost 3,500 previous viewings in its history succumbed to our attacks
almost 80% of the time.
Consistent with the Pearson coefficients reported earlier, we find that the success
of our attacks depends on the rankings and lengths of the videos that are otherwise
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suggested based upon a user’s history. In particular, we observe that the majority of
the videos recommended to users for whom our attacks have low promotion rates have
longer lengths and more view counts than our target videos, while the videos that
YouTube recommends based on the watch history of the user with 3,500 previous
viewings have shorter lengths than our target videos (though they generally have
higher view counts than our targets).
While we believe our attack clearly demonstrates that YouTube’s personalization
mechanism is subject to exploit, it is not clear how long lasting such exploits would
be, nor how easy they are to defend against. In our experiments, volunteers watch
arbitrary YouTube videos right after being attacked, but we believe our pollution
attacks on YouTube are likely to last for a significant period of time. While YouTube
does not explicitly disclose how time factors into their recommendation system (if
at all) [38], analysis of volunteers’ watch histories indicates that a YouTube video
that was watched as long as two weeks prior is still used for generating recommended
videos.
3.3 Google Personalized Search
In this section, show how history pollution attacks can be launched against Google’s
search engine. The goal of our attack is to promote a target webpage’s rank in the
personalized results Google returns for an arbitrary search term by injecting seed
search terms into a victim’s search history.
3.3.1 How Personalized Search Works
Search personalization uses information about users including their previous query
terms, click-through data and previously visited websites to customize results. The
details of Google’s personalization algorithms are not public, but many previous stud-
ies have explored aspects of personalized search [28,36,41,56,59,71,76,78,80–82]. We
describe two classes of personalization algorithms: contextual personalization and
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persistent personalization. According to recent reports [73, 74], many search engines
including Google, Bing, and Yahoo! apply both types of personalization.
Contextual personalization constructs a short-term user profile based on recent
searches and click-throughs [36, 80]. When a user searches for “inexpensive furni-
ture” followed by “maternity clothes,” Google’s contextual personalization algorithm
typically promotes search results that relate to “inexpensive maternity clothes” for
the next few searches. In contrast, persistent personalization uses the entire search
history—as opposed to only recent searches—to develop a user profile [59, 78]. Per-
sonalization that occurs over the longer term may not affect a user’s search results as
dramatically, but can have longer-lasting effects for the results that a user sees. For
example, searching for “Egypt” using different accounts may result in two distinct
result sets: one about tourism in Egypt and the other related to the Arab Spring.
3.3.2 Identifying Search Terms
Given the differing underlying algorithsm that govern contextual and persistent per-
sonalization, an attacker needs to select different sets of seed search terms depending
on the type of attack she hopes to launch.
Contextual Personalization. For the contextual personalization attack, the key-
words injected into a user’s search history should be both relevant to the promoting
keyword and unique to the website being promoted. In particular, the keywords
should be distinct with respect to other websites with close ranking positions so that
the only website promoted is the target website and no other closely-related web-
sites. Presumably, an attacker promoting a specific website will be familiar with the
website and know what keywords best meet these criteria. However, good candidate
keywords can be obtained using automation by examining a website’s meta keyword
tag. While Google no longer incorporates meta tags into their ranking function [97],
the keywords listed in the meta keyword tag provide a good summary of the page’s
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content.
Persistent Personalization. Carrying out a persistent personalization attack re-
quires a different method of obtaining keywords to inject. In this case, the size of
the keyword set should be larger than that used for a contextual attack in order to
have a greater impact on the user’s search history. Recall that contextual attacks
only impact a user’s current session, while persistent attacks pollute a user’s search
history in order to have a lasting impact on the user’s search results. Good candidate
keywords are found using the Google AdWords tool, which takes as an input a search
term and URL and produces a list of about one hundred related keywords. Ideally,
an attacker would pollute a user’s search history with each of these terms. Doing
so takes time, however. We determined that an attacker can safely inject roughly
50 keywords a minute using cross-site request forgery; more rapid search queries are
flagged by Google as a screen-scraping attack. For this study we assume an attacker
can inject a maximum of 25 keywords into a user’s profile, but the number of key-
words can increase if the user stays on a webpage longer than 30 seconds. Not all
keyword lists return by the AdWords tool actually promote the target website, how-
ever. The effectiveness of this attack likely depends on several factors, including the
user’s current search history, time, etc. In Section 3.3.5, we evaluate the effectiveness
of this attack under different conditions.
3.3.3 Injecting Search Terms
Similar to the attacks on YouTube, the attack on Google’s personalized search also
harnesses XSRF to inject the seeds. For example, an attacker can forge a Google
search by embedding https://www.google.com/search?hl=en&site=&q=usenix+
security+2013 into an invisible iframe. Injecting search terms into a Google user’s
account affects the search results of the user’s subsequent searches. The exact number
and set of search terms to inject differs depending on whether an attacker carries out
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a contextual or persistent personalization attack.
3.3.4 Experimental Design
To cleanly study the effects of our proposed attacks on contextual and persistent
search personalization, we conduct most of our experiments using Google accounts
with no search history. To validate whether our results apply to real users, we also
conduct a limited number of tests using accounts that we construct to mimic the
personae of real users.
To quantify the effectiveness of our attack in general, we must select an unbiased
set of target Web pages whose rankings we wish to improve. We build two test cor-
pora, one for attacks on contextual personalization, and one for attacks on persistent
personalization. We attempt to promote existing Websites using only their current
content and link structure; we do not perform any SEO—white or black hat—on
Websites before conducting our attacks. We believe this represents a conservative
lower bound on the effectiveness of the attack, as any individual Website owner could
engineer the content of their site to tailor it for promotion through search history
pollution.
3.3.4.1 Contextual Pollution
We start by scraping 5,671 shopping-related keywords from made-in-china.com to
use as search terms. We then enter each of these terms into Google one-by-one to
obtain the top 30 (un-personalized) search results for each. Because some of our search
terms are related, not all of these URLs are unique. Additionally, we cannot hope
to improve the URLs that are already top-ranked for each of the search terms. This
leaves us with a corpus of 151,363 URLs whose ranking we could hope to improve.
Because we could not manually inspect each of these Websites to determine ap-
propriate seed search terms, we instead focus on the subset of them that include a
meta keyword tag. For the approximately 90,000 such sites, we extract the provided
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keywords or phrases, exactly as provided by the Website. Clearly many of these
keywords are generic and will appear in a wide variety of Websites—to launch the
attack, we require keywords that are unique to the Website we wish to promote (at
least relative to the other URLs returned in response to the same query). Hence, we
ignore any keywords that are associated with multiple URLs in the same set of search
results.
After this procedure, we end up with 2,136 target URLs spanning 1,739 different
search terms for which we have a set of 1–3 seed keywords to try to launch a contextual
pollution attack. The average search term has 1.23 results whose ranking we will
try to improve. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the original rankings for each of
these target Webpages; the distribution is skewed toward highly ranked sites, perhaps
because these sites take care in selecting their meta tag keywords.
3.3.4.2 Persistent Pollution
Once again, we begin by selecting 551 shopping-related search terms and perform
Google searches with each of the search terms to retrieve the top 30 search results.
As opposed to the contextual attack, where we searched for keywords that differentiate
the results from one another, we aim to find search terms that will be associated with
the Website and search-term pair for the long term.
As described in Section 3.3.2, we use a tool provided by Google AdWords to
obtain a list of keywords that Google associates with the given URL and search term.
Constructing related keyword lists for each of the 29 search returns (again excluding
the top hit, which we cannot hope to improve) and 551 search terms yields 15,979
distinct URLs with associated lists of keywords.
For each URL, we select 25 random keywords from the AdWords list for 25 distinct
trials. If a trial improves a URL’s ranking, we then test the persistence of the attack
by performing 20 subsequent queries, each with a randomly chosen set of Google
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trending keywords. These subsequent queries help us verify that the URL promotion
is not just contextual, but does not vanish when a user searches other content. If,
after all 25 trials, we find no keyword sets that promote the URL’s ranking and keep
it there for 20 subsequent searchers, we deem this URL attempt a failure. If multiple
keyword sets succeed, we select the most effective (i.e., the set of 25 keywords that
induces the largest ranking improvement) trial to include in the test set.
3.3.5 Evaluation
In this section, we seek to quantify the effectiveness of search history pollution by
simulating attacks that seek to promote the target Websites identified in the previous
section. To scope our measurements, we consider the effectiveness of the attacks only
for the set of search terms that we identified; it is quite possible, of course, that our
pollution attacks also affect the rankings of the targeted URLs for other search terms.
When measuring the effectiveness of our attack, we use two different criteria,
depending upon a Website’s original position in the search results. In the case of
URLs that are already on the front page of search results (i.e., results 2–10), we
consider the pollution attack successful if it increases the ranking of a URL at all.
For the case of URLs that are on subsequent pages, however, we consider the attack
successful only if the attack moves the URL to the first page of search results, since
improved ranking on any page that is not the first page is not likely to have any real
utility.
3.3.5.1 Top-Ranked Sites
For our 2,136-page contextual attack test corpus, of the 846 pages that appeared
on the front page prior to our attack, we improved the ranking of 371 (44%). The
persistent attack was markedly less effective, as only 851 (17%) of the 4,959 test
cases that originally appeared on the first page of the search results survived the
persistence test (i.e., they remained promoted after 20 random subsequent queries).
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In both cases, however, the probability of success depends greatly on the original
ranking of the targeted URL. For example, moving a second-ranked URL to the top-
ranked position for contextual personalization succeeded 1.1% of the time, whereas
moving a tenth-ranked URL up by at least one position succeeded 62.8% of the time.
Similarly, for attacks on persistent personalization, moving a second-ranked URL to
the top succeeded 4.3% of the time, and moving a tenth-ranked URL to a higher-
ranked position succeeded 22.7% of the time. These results make sense, because
second-ranked sites can only move into the top-ranked position, whereas sites that
are ranked tenth can move into any one of nine higher spots.
To illustrate this effect, and illuminate how far each webpage is promoted, Figure 9
shows the PDF of an improved webpage’s rank after contextual history pollution,
based upon its position in the non-personalized search results. We observe that most
webpages are promoted 1 to 2 spots via our contextual pollution attack. However,
there also exist many left tails, meaning that some webpages are promoted to very
high ranks even if they are originally ranked very low. Similarly, Figure 10 shows the
distributions for each result ranking for those websites whose rankings were improved
by a persistent history pollution attack. Here, the distributions appear roughly similar
(although the absolute probability of success is much lower), but it is hard to draw
any strong conclusions due to the small number of promoted sites of each rank for
either class of attack.
3.3.5.2 The Next Tier
The remaining 1,290 of our test websites for the contextual attack started on the
second or third page of search results. By polluting a user’s search history with the
unique meta tag keywords associated with each site, we promoted 358 of them (28%)
to the front page. Interestingly enough, Figure 9(j) shows that these websites have
a higher chance of ending up at the very top of the results than those pages that
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started at the bottom of the first page in our data set. We suspect this phenomenon
results from the choice of keywords used in pollution: because their original rankings
were low, it will take a distinguishing keyword to move one of the webpages to the
front page at all. If such a keyword is capable of doing so, it may be more likely to
be sufficiently distinguished to move the page nearly to the top of the results.
Here, the results from the persistent test set are markedly different. Figure 10(j)
shows that sites starting on the second or third page are extremely unlikely to end up
at the very top of the result list due to a persistent history attack. Indeed, only 80
(less than 1%) of the 11,020 attacks that attempted to promote a website appearing
on the 2nd or 3rd page of results was successful in moving it to the front page (and
keeping it there). From this result we can clearly see that persistent search history
attacks are generally best launched for sites that are already highly ranked, as opposed
to contextual attacks, which can help even lower-ranked sites.
3.3.5.3 Real Users
Finally, we further evaluate the effectiveness of our successful attacks on ten volun-
teers’ accounts with extensive pre-existing search histories. We find that, on average,
97.1% of our 729 previously successful contextual attacks remain successful, while
only 77.78% of the persistent pollution attacks that worked on fresh accounts achieve
similar success. Presumably the remainder are counter-acted by biases in the user’s
own search histories. The disparity between the test sets is likely due to the increased
noise in the long-term search history. Contextualized attacks rely only on a small set
of recent search terms to alter the personalized search results, which is unlikely to be
affected by a user’s search history. In contract, persistent poisoning relies on a much
larger portion of a user’s search history. If relevant keywords are already present in
a user’s search history, it may render some poisoning search terms ineffective. In any
event, both class of attacks are relatively robust even when launched against users
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with long search histories.
3.4 Pollution Attacks on Amazon
Of the three services, Amazon’s personalization is perhaps the most direct and obvious
to the end user. On the one hand, it makes pollution-based attacks less insidious, as
they will be plainly visible to the observant user. On the other, of the three services,
Amazon has the most direct monetization of its screen real estate—users may directly
purchase the goods from Amazon—so it is possible that any exploitation of Amazon’s
personalization can be profitable to an enterprising attacker.
Amazon tailors a customer’s homepage based upon the previous purchase, brows-
ing and searching behavior of the user. Amazon product recommendations consider
each of these three activities individually, and explicitly labels its recommendations
according to the aspect of the user’s history it used to generate them. For our pur-
poses, we focus on the personalized recommendations Amazon generates based upon
the browsing and searching activities of a customer because manipulating the previous
purchase history of a customer may have unintended consequences.
3.4.1 Amazon Recommendations
In general, Amazon displays on a customer’s homepage five separate recommendation
lists that are ostensibly computed based on the customer’s searching and browsing
history. Among the lists, four of them are computed based on the products that
the customer has viewed lately (view-based recommendation lists) and the last is
computed based upon the latest search term the customer entered (a search-based
recommendation list). For each of the view-based recommendation lists, Amazon uses
co-visitation relationships between products to compute corresponding recommended
products (here the co-visitation relationship between a product pair on Amazon means
how often two products are purchased together). In other words, Amazon uses each
of the four most recently viewed products to compute a personalized view-based
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recommendation list. For the recommendation list that is computed based on the
latest search term of a customer, the recommended products are the top-ranked results
for the latest search term.
A key distinction between the operation of Amazon’s personalization and the
other two services is that, aside from purchase-based personalization, Amazon’s per-
sonalization is controlled by the user’s Web browser as opposed to the service itself.
Because customers frequently do not sign into their accounts when browsing on Ama-
zon, both the latest viewed products and search term of the customer are stored in
session cookies on the user’s browser rather than in profiles on Amazon servers.
3.4.2 Identifying Seed Products and Terms
Because Amazon computes the view and search-based recommendation lists sepa-
rately, the seed data needed to exploit each is necessarily different.
Visit-based pollution. To promote a targeted product in a view-based recommen-
dation list, an attacker needs to identify a seed product as follows. Given a targeted
product that an attacker wishes to promote, the attacker visits the Amazon page of
the product and retrieves the related products that are shown on Amazon page of the
targeted product. To test the suitability of these related products, the attacker can
visit the Amazon page of that product and then check the contents of the Amazon
home page. If the targeted product is shown in a recommendation list, the URL of
the candidate related product can be used as a seed to promote the targeted product.
Search based. To promote a targeted product in a search-based recommendation
list it suffices to identify an appropriate search term. If automation is desired, an
attacker could use a natural language toolkit to automatically extract a candidate
keyword set from the targeted product’s name. Any combination of these keywords
that successfully isolates the targeted product can be used as the seed search term
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for promoting the targeted product. For example, to promote product “Breville
BJE200XL Compact Juice Fountain 700-Watt Juice Extractor", an attacker for ex-
ample can inject search term “Breville BJE200XL" to replace an Amazon customer’s
latest search term through XSRF.
3.4.3 Injecting Views/Searches
As with attacks on the previous two services, the attacker embeds the Amazon
URLs of her desired seed items or search queries in her own website. For exam-
ple, if one seed search terms is “Coffee Maker”, the seed URL would be something
like http://www.amazon.com/s/?field-keywords=Coffee+Maker. Similarly, an at-
tacker could embed the URL of a seed product into an invisible img tag as the src
of the image. Once a victim visits the attacker’s website, Amazon would believe that
she has made that search query (viewed that item) and, unless the victim clears her
cookies, customize her Amazon homepage based upon this search. In particular, these
will be the most recent activities the next time the victim visits Amazon, so they will
be shown first among the recommendation lists.
3.4.4 Experimental Design
To evaluate the effectiveness of our attack, we conduct two experiments. Our first
experiment measures the effectiveness of our attack when targeted toward popular
items across different categories of Amazon products. The second quantifies the
effectiveness of our attack on randomly selected, mostly unpopular Amazon products.
3.4.4.1 Popular Products
Amazon categorizes sellers’ products into 32 root categories. To select products from
each category, we scrape the top 100 best-selling products in each category in January
2013, and launch a separate attack targeting each of these 3,200 items.
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3.4.4.2 Random Products
To evaluate the effectiveness of attempting to promote arbitrary products, we also
select products randomly. In particular, we download a list of Amazon Standard
Identification Number (ASIN) [25] that includes 75,115,473 ASIN records. Since each
ASIN represents a Amazon product, we randomly sample ASINs from the list and
construct a set of 3,000 products currently available for sale. For every randomly
selected product in the list, we also record the sale ranking of that product in its
corresponding category.
3.4.5 Evaluation
Because Amazon computes search and visit-based recommendations based entirely
upon the most recent history, there is no need to experiment with real user’s Amazon
accounts. Hence, we measure the effectiveness of our attack by studying the success
rate of promoting our targeted products for fresh Amazon accounts.
3.4.5.1 Promoting Products in Different Categories
To validate the success of our attack on each targeted product, we check whether the
ASIN of the targeted product matches the ASIN of an item in the recommendation
lists on the user’s customized Amazon homepage.
Figure 11 illustrates the promotion rate of target products in each category. The
view-based and search-based attacks produce similar promotion rates across all cate-
gories (about 78% on average). Two categories stand out as yielding markedly lower
promotion rates than the rest: Gift-Cards-Store and Movies-TV (achieving 5% and
25%, respectively).
In order to understand why these categories yield lower promotion rates, we ana-
lyze the top 100 best selling products for each category. For Gift-Cards-Store, we find
that there are two factors that distinguish gift cards from other product types. First,
the gift cards all have very similar names; therefore, using the keywords derived from
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the product name results in only a small number of specific gift cards being recom-
mended. Second, we find that searching for any combination of keywords extracted
from the product names always causes a promotion of Amazon’s own gift cards, which
may imply that it is more difficult to promote product types that Amazon competes
with directly.
Further investigation into the Movies-TV category reveals that Amazon recom-
mends TV episodes in a different way. In our attempts to promote specific TV
episodes, we find that Amazon recommends instead the first or latest episode of the
corresponding TV series or the entire series. Because we declare a promotion suc-
cessful only if the exact ASIN appears in the recommendation lists, these alternate
recommendations are considered failures. However, we argue that these cases should
be counted as successful because the attack caused the promotion of very similar
products. Therefore, we believe that for all categories except for Gift-Cards-Store,
an attacker has a very high chance of successfully promoting best selling products.
3.4.5.2 Promoting Randomly Selected Products
We launch pollution attacks on 3,000 randomly selected products. We calculate the
Cumulative Success Rate of products with respect to their rankings. The Cumulative
Success Rate for a given range of product rankings is defined as the ratio of the
number of successfully promoted products to the number of target products in that
range.
Figure 12 shows the cumulative promotion rate for varying product rankings for
the two different types of pollution attacks. As the target product decrease in pop-
ularity (i.e., have a higher ranking position within their category) pollution attacks
become less effective. However, this is a limitation of Amazon recommendation al-
gorithms, not our attack. For products with very low rankings, there is little chance
that they have been bought by many users. Hence, they may have very few and
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weak co-visit and co-purchase relationships with other products. It is difficult to say
precisely without further study, but it appears that products ranking 2,000 or higher
within their category have at least a 50% chance of being promoted by a visit-based
pollution attack, and products with rankings 10,000 and higher have at least a 30%
chance to be promoted using search-based attacks.
3.5 Discussion
There are several limitations with our current study. Most notably, the scale of our
experiments is modest. However, since in most instances we randomly selected the
target items, we believe that the results of our experiments are representative, and
they illustrate the substantial potential impacts of pollution attacks. Similarly, our
specific attacks are fragile; there are a number of steps each service could take to
defend themselves.
A possible defense against our pollution attacks is that cross-site request forgery
can be stopped by requiring that requests to a website carry tokens issued by the
site. However, the result is that cross-site user information and behaviors cannot
be harvested for personalization. This goes against the current trend of constantly
increasing the scope of data collection by websites. Thus, a positive impact of our
work may be that (some) websites will begin to consider the trade-offs between the
security and benefits of personalization.
YouTube in particular uses two separate HTTP requests to track a YouTube’s
user watching activity, and these are entirely independent from the actual streaming
of the video. One straightforward defense mechanism against our pollution attacks
is to monitor the time between the arrivals of the two HTTP requests. If YouTube
finds the interval is substantially less than the length of the video, it could ignore the
signal. However, an attacker can always inject a short video or control the timing of
the HTTP requests in an effort to bypass such a defense mechanism. Anecdotally,
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we find that an injected short video can be used to promote multiple longer videos.
For example, watching one 2-second video [75] causes YouTube to recommend several
long videos.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a new attack on personalized services that exploits the
fact that personalized services use a user’s past history to customize content that
they present to the user. Our attack pollutes a user’s history by using cross-site
request forgery to stealthily inject and execute a set of targeted browsing activities
in the user’s browser, so that when the user subsequently accesses the associated
service specific content is promoted. We illustrate how an attacker can pollute a
user’s history to promote certain content across three platforms. While our attack is
simple, its impact can be significant if enough users’ histories are compromised.
As personalization algorithms and mechanisms increasingly control our interac-
tions with the Internet, it is inevitable that they will become the targets of financially
motivated attacks. While we demonstrate pollution attacks only on YouTube, Google,
and Amazon, we believe that our methods are general and can be widely applied to
services that leverage personalization technologies, such as Facebook, Twitter, Net-
flix, Pandora, etc. The attacks we present here are just (the first) few examples
of potentially many possible attacks on personalization. With increasingly complex
algorithms and data collection mechanisms aiming for ever higher financial stakes,
there are bound to be more vulnerabilities that will be exploited by motivated at-






Figure 2: Websites with personalized services (personalized services tailor the data in the
red rectangles).
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Figure 3: Overview of how history pollution can ultimately affect the user’s choice set.


















Figure 4: The promotion rate for each of the 25 target videos in channel lady16makeup.
Two videos were recommended in each of the 114 trials.
























(a) Higher ranked video
























(b) Lower ranked video
Figure 5: Distribution of the suggestion slots occupied by each of the two successfully
promoted target videos.
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Figure 6: Suggestion lists before (left) and after (right) a pollution attack against a fresh































Figure 7: Promotion success rates for 10 real YouTube user accounts with varying watch
history lengths.

















Figure 8: Google’s original rank distribution for the 2,136 webpages whose ranking we
attempt to improve with contextual search history pollution.
37


















































































































































































































Figure 9: Promotion rates of promoted Google search rankings for successful contextual
history pollution attacks.
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Figure 11: Promotion rates across Amazon categories.
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Given the ever-expanding user base, personalization is a key weapon for many web
services. For example, each search engine seeks to tailor search results not only to
the query term, but the end user herself [28, 31, 46, 56, 59, 71, 76, 78, 82, 83], based
upon the user’s past search history, clicks, geographic location, device type, and
other features that may help identify the user’s preferences and predispositions [46].
Ideally, personalization identifies results that closely match the user’s preferences and
intent, and, therefore improve user satisfaction and, ultimately, increase revenue for
the service providers.
In practice, web personalization can hide certain important information from
users, and distort their perception of content on the web. As is discussed in Chap-
ter 3, personalization services can be exploited by pollution attack to deliver contents
intended by attackers [92]. In particular, this new form of attack uses the general
form of cross-site scripting attack to contaminate users’ profile and alter the cus-
tomized content in predictable ways. Therefore, we can imagine that an adversary
may leverage this attack to impact a user’s mind and action. As is shown in Figure 13,
inconsistent search results arise when a user searches for “a victorian lady inn” before
and after her search history gets contaminated. In this example, we observe that
pollution attack results in the negative information about the victorian lady inn to
be suppressed from the user’s search results. Our intuition suggests this may sway
the user’s perception concerning this business.
In this chapter, our goal is to put aside aforementioned information prejudices. We
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Figure 13: Inconsistent search results before and after pollution attacks.
approach this goal by two different strategies. As pollution attack is typically against
individual users and at a high cost when carried out against a large number of users,
our first strategy seeks to use a crowdsourcing approach to undermine the influence
of pollution attack. In particular, this approach aggregates information from multiple
users and presents information with different viewpoints to the victim. Different from
the first strategy, our second strategy copes with information prejudices by facilitating
users to strip away invalid data items from their profiles. In particular, this strategy
leverages a wider variety of personas to identify the data items possibly contaminated
and make them visbile to the point where a victim can determine their validity.
We demonstrate the aforementioned strategies on Google personalized search. In
particular, we prototyped BobbleX – a client side tool that helps users to undermine
the impact of information prejudices. The evaluation of BobbleX shows that it has a
false positive rate of 0.02 when it remains its true positive rate at 0.8.
4.1 Defense Strategies




















(b) Search results crowdsourced from others.
Figure 14: Search results with sentiment.
4.1.1 Strategy 1
The first strategy is accomplished by a crowdsourcing approach. When a user submits
a query to a personalization service, this approach catches her query and distributes
it to other participants. The participants then pass the user’s query to the same
service along with their own profiles. Due to the difference in profiles, the person-
alization service tailors and returns different output to the participants who then
forward them to the user. After retrieving information from multiple participants,
the user obtains not only a set of information tailored to herself but also a set of
information crowdsourced. Using an opinion mining technique, the crowdsourcing
approach further analyses information in each set and compares viewpoints between
the sets. When detecting a significant difference in opinions, this approach raises the
user’s awareness by showing information with different opinions. To illustrate this
viewpoint comparison, Figure 14 shows an example where we attach sentiment to
each search result. From Figure 14(a), we can observe that the result set expresses
a mostly neutral and slightly positve proposition, while the overall sentiment in the
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another set is mostly neutral and slightly negative. In this case, the result with a nega-
tive label is absent from the user’s results, and therefore, the crowdsourcing approach
automatically presents this missing result to the user.
Intuition suggests that the crowdsourcing approach could undermine information
prejudices influenced by pollution attack because an attacker would need to contam-
inate the profiles of many participants in order to bypass this mitigation strategy.
However, this approach may exhibit some false positives because personalization al-
gorithms themselves can over-customize a user’s output and narrow her perspectives
even though no attacker exploits personalization services. In this work, such false pos-
itives neither indicate the ineffectiveness of the crowdsourcing approach nor threaten
to overwhelem users because the users needs to stay mindful of information prejudices
regardless of the attribution behind the prejudices.
4.1.2 Strategy 2
As pollution attack inserts invalid data to user profiles, our second strategy aims to
facilitate users to strip away invalid data. It utilizes a data correlation mechanism to
identify possibly invalid data in a user’s profile and then makes these possibly invalid
data visible to the point where the user can easily verify their validity. Given cus-
tomized output with an extreme viewpoint, in particular, the correlation mechanism
cultivates a wider variety of personas, each of which is an account containing a data
subset in the user’s profile. As each persona consists of similar but not identical data
subset, the correlation mechanism can query the personalization service with differ-
ent personas and obtain different output. By comparing each of these output with
the one that the personalization service tailors to the user herself, the correlation
mechanism can identify the data items that attribute to the output with the extreme
viewpoint. For example, assuming a user observes customized output with an ex-

























Sentiment difference between sets 
Possibly invalid data: {Sk-1 , Sk} 
Figure 15: Identifying possibly invalid data items using a search persona.
hold such output to account. Similar to the first strategy, customized output with an
extreme viewpoint may not be necesarily attributed to pollution attack. Instead of
correcting one’s profile automatically, this strategy therefore presents suspicious data
items and leaves the data validation to the end users.
4.2 Prejudice Mitigation on Google Personalized Search
In this section, we demonstrate our prejudice mitigation strategies on Google person-
alized search. In particular, we build a client side tool – BobbleX which accomplishes
the aforementioned two strategies as follows.
To accomplish the first strategy, BobbleX crowdsources search results by distribut-
ing a user’s query to other participants, who then use their own search profiles (i.e.,
search accounts) to perform the same search and return their results to the user.
Then, BobbleX uses a sentiment analysis approach to assign sentiments to search
results. These results include the user’s own results as well as the corresponding re-
sults crowdsourced. Based on the sentiments assigned, BobbleX compares the overall
viewpoints in the two result sets and presents to the user the results with different
sentiments. In particular, BobbleX intersects distinct sentiments included in each set
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and outputs the results with disjoint sentiments. Take Figure 14 for example again.
In this specific case, BobbleX outputs the result with the negative sentiment because
it is absent in the user’s result set where the distinct sentiments include neutral and
positive.
BobbleX accomplishes the second strategy by first assigning sentiment to the
results in the set tailored to the user. Then, it examines the overall sentiment of
that set. If the results in that set are not distributed across the entire spectrums of
sentiment, it means the results express an extreme viewpoint and may sway the user’s
perception. Thus, BobbleX further performs the same search using predetermined
personas, and compares the overall sentiment of each result set with that of the
user’s result set. When detecting difference in sentiment between two sets, BobbleX
intersects the data items in the search persona and profile, and eventually outputs
disjoint data items. The disjoint data items are responsible for the extreme viewpoint
presented to the user and might be inserted by attackers for influencing the user’s
decision. As a result, BobbleX presents these disjoint data items to the user who can
then examine and even discard them if they are indeed invalid. Figure 15 illustrates
an example of identifying possibly invalid data in a user’s profile by using a search
persona.
4.3 Analysing Sentiment in Search Results
As is discussed in the section above, both of the prejudice mitigation strategies rely on
sentiment analysis to assign sentiment to search results. In this section, we introduce
a sentiment analysis approach. In particular, I begin with describing the challenges
of sentiment analysis in the context of prejudice mitgiation. Following that, we then
propose a sentiment analysis approach.
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4.3.1 Technical Challenges
Since users usually navigate to landing pages quickly from their search pages, BobbleX
needs to examine prejudices in search results in advance of their navigation. Or put
it in another way, BobbleX needs to perform sentiment analysis efficiently.
In general, the sentiment of a search result may lay beneath its landing page. To
pull it to the surface, a sentiment analysis approach needs to examine the landing
pages of search results, and then apply sentiment-based classification to catgorize the
pages into positive, neutral or negative.
Many prior classification approaches can be used to categorize pages into senti-
ment [32,34]. However, they are typically time intensive and not applicable to infor-
mation prejudice mitigation. Given a page, the prior approaches refine information
from its neighboring pages, which usually follows a long spell.
4.3.2 Sentiment Analysis
Considering the challenge mentioned above, we propose a sentiment-based classifica-
tion approach that does not rely on any neighboring pages. Instead, our approach
works as follows. First, it distills informative text from search results and their landing
pages. Based on the informative text distilled, it then extracts and selects features.
Using these features, our approach utilizes a supervised machine learning method to
build classifiers for sentiment categorization.
4.3.2.1 Distilling Informative Text
As is shown in Figure 16, a search result consists mainly of three segments - a page
title, a landing page URL and a snippet. The generation of the page title and snippet
is completely automated and takes into account the content of the landing page.
Therefore, they represent not only the summary of a landing page but sometimes
reflect the proposition hidden behind the landing page. For example, the highlighted
search result in Figure 16 can quickly lead users to draw a negative impression on
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Title URL Snippet 
Figure 16: The search results that may leave negative impressions to searchers.
AT&T. In this work, we therefore distill text from both the page title and snippet
in a search result. In addition, the domain name shown in a landing page URL
occasionally reflects the sentiment of a search result. For example, the search result of
a commercial product from scambook.com or ripoffreport.com can leave a negative
impression to its potential customers. As a result, we also extract domain names from
landing page URLs.
To categorize search results, we further examine and extract content from landing
pages because they carry the opinions that page editors intend to convey. Considering
most landing pages are structured in an HTML format, where useful information
is often accompanied by a large amount of noise such as banner advertisement or
navigation bars, we develop the following approach that discards noisy information
items and only extracts informative content from landing pages.
In general, the landing page of a search result is structured in either a PDF
or an HTML format. Empirically, PDF-formatted landing pages do not contain
aforementioned nosiy information. As a result, we retrieve text in PDF-formatted
landing pages without refining. In particular, we retrieve text by using PDF extractor
slate 0.4 [77]. For any PDF page formatted as an image, we utilize an OCR (optical
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Figure 17: Informative content blocks and their corresponding HTML tags.
retrieve text from it.
For landing pages in HTML, we refine their content by following a heuristic ap-
proach. A landing page in HTML corresponds to a DOM tree where tags are internal
nodes and detailed text, images or hyperlinks are the leaf nodes. Given an HTML-
formatted landing page, there is no straighforward approach that can get rid of inter-
nal nodes representing noisy information items. Fortunately, we observe that noisy
information items - such as navigation bars or advertisement banners - are usually
structured in <div> and <span> tags while informative items typically correspond
to the following tags.
• <p> tag defines a paragraph of an article;
• <h1>· · ·<h6> tags define the headings of an article, where <h1> defines the
most important heading and <h6> defines the least important one;
• <title> tag is required in all HTML pages and defines the title of an article;
• <meta name="description"> tag specifies a short description of an HTML page.
We therefore extract text from these tags. Figure 17 shows a webpage where the
information corresponding to these tags are highlighted. As we can observe in the
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figure, some noisy information items (e.g., the navigation bar and advertisement
banners) are successfully excluded.
Following the information extraction above, we could obtain the text with infor-
mative content. However, the extracted text still contain some noisy information
which may hamper sentiment analysis. In Figure 17, we discover some hightlighted
text (such as the editing information about the article) are not useful for sentiment
analysis. To eliminate such text, we futher use a statistical language model [72] which
outputs a probability for each text block base on how likely that text block is to be
a sentence in English. In particular, we set up a probability threshold to further
get rid of less informative content. Taking the two information blocks highlighted
in Figure 17, for example, a statistical language model outputs a higher probabil-
ity for information block “And at least on vote, prosecutor said Wednesday, was for
sale" than information block “By STEPHANIE CLIFFORD and MATT APUZZO
May 27, 2015". Using the predetermined threshold, we can easily exclude the second
information block.
Using the aforementioned information extraction approach, we can accurately dis-
till informative text from most landing pages. However, we discover such an approach
sometimes is not effective for some pages whose editors use other HTML tags to lay
out their informative content. Rather than using <p> tags to structure paragraphs of
an article, for example, an HTML page editor could utilize <table> and even <div>
tags to lay out the article. So, we further examine and retrieve the detailed text under
these tags.
HTML tags like <div> can be used for structuring noisy and informative text
blocks. To filter out informative text block from these tags, we extend our afore-
mentioned heuristic approach. In particular, we compare the class attributes in these
tags with those in tags that we have already selected as informative. Using the
aforemented heuristic approach, for example, we have already extracted informative
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text from tag <p class=“story-body-text story-content"> ... </p>. We can extract
its class attribute “story-body-text story-content" and search similar strings in other
tags1. The reason is that page editors usually use class attribute to describe the type
of an information block and we can use their descriptions about informative text
blocks to find more informative text under other HTML tags. For example, string
story-body-text story-content indicates that the text under this <p> tag is the body
text of a story which includes the opinion of the story and can be useful for sentiment
analysis. So, a similar string in other HTML tag indicates the text under the tag is
also useful for sentiment analysis, e.g., text in tag <div class=“body-text">...</div>.
4.3.2.2 Extracting Features
Having the informative text from search results and corresponding landing pages,
we now explore the features that are likely to have a positive impact on sentiment
analysis.
Given a sentiment-based classification problem. one instinctive solution is to ap-
ply existing text categorization approaches [85, 94, 95] which represent documents
– in our case, search results and their landing pages – as a native feature space
consisting of the unique words that occur in documents. As we will show in Sec-
tion 5.3, this solution cannot provide us with optimal classification performance be-
cause the words that occur in different parts of search results and landing pages may
contribute differently to classification. Consider word “complaint” appearing in the
domain domain in one URL (e.g., http://www.complaintsboard.com/complaints/
macy039s-furniture-and-bedding-c56442.html), and in the text of a landing page
(e.g., ... Questions? Comments? Complaints? We’ll quickly get back to you with the
information you need.). In the first case, we know the site includes consumer news
and database of rated complaints submitted by users. So, the content from the site
1In this work, we compute the similarity of two strings using the Levenshtein distance [65].
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is highly likely to discuss a disreputable business and any search results linking to
the site are likely to leave negative impressions to searchers. In the second case, the
landing page is for customer services. Though it contains a word with a negative
sentiment, the landing page does not convey a negative message to searchers when
they visit the page. As a result, distinguishing where words occur may improve the
accuracy of sentiment analysis.
We create word features that indicate which part the word comes from. In partic-
ular, we begin with filtering out stop words – the most common words in a language
such as the, to, that, etc. Then, we take each of the remaining words from informative
text and attach its corresponding HTML tag because the combination of word and its
HTML tag indicates the origin of the word. Given a <p> tag with informative text
“And at least one vote, prosecutor said, was for sale”, for example, we extract word
features including <p>least, <p>vote, <p>prosecutor, <p>sale. For search results
(that we do not extract informative text based on their HTML tags), we attach tag
<search-title> and <search-snippet> to the correpsonding segments of each search
result. Finally, we extract the domain name of each URL, partition it into meaning-
ful word units and attach tag <url> to each word unit. For example, URL http://
www.complaintsboard.com/complaints/park-west-gallery-c68078.html can be
segmented into feature <url>complaints and <url>board.
4.3.2.3 Feature Selection and Classification
Using word features extracted above, we can create a feature space with tens or
hundreds of thousands of word and HTML tag combinations. According to a prior
study [96], such a high dimensionality of feature space can hinder many learning al-
gorithms. Therefore, we use a term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf)
to reduce the dimenionality of our feature space. In particular, we compute term
frequency (tf) and inverse document frequency (idf) for each unique aforementioned
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word feature in our training corpus and remove from the feature space those word
features whose tf and idf product is less than some predetermined threshold. We
represent each search result using the reduced feature space and then apply an Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM) learning algorithm to train a classification model. In
Section 5.3, we will provide detailed evaluation for our sentiment-based classification
approach.
4.4 Generating Personas
As is discussed in Section 4.2, one of our prejudice mitigation strategies uses prede-
termined personas to identify possibly invalid data in one’s search profile. In this
section, we discuss the technical challenges of persona generation, and then describe
a practical approach to address these challenges.
4.4.1 Technical Challenges
A search persona is a subset of the past searches in a user’s search profile. Ideally,
it needs to be generated in a dynamic way. For example, BobbleX detects prejudices
in search results when the user performs a search. To identify the past searches
attributed to the bias, one solution is to build a persona “petri dish” – by duplicating
all the searches in the user’s search profile except searches that might be relevant to
the user’s outcome – and then cultivate new personas from it.
However, such an approach is not practical. According to our observation and
prior studies [29, 49], search personalization relies on many signals to tailor one’s
search results. Some important signals include search terms, user clicks, geographic
region and timing. When duplicating searches from one’s profile, a persona generation
approach can easily copy past search terms and maybe user clicks by repeating the
searches and clicking their results in a new search account. However, this process
follows a long spell because the data needed in a persona should be dynamically
determined and generating one persona needs to duplicate a sheer number of searches.
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In addition, generating a persona in this dynamic way neglects the timing factor
that search personalization relies on, which jeopardizes the effectiveness of identifying
invalid data.
4.4.2 Persona Generation
To address the challenge above, we introduce a practical approach that builds per-
sonas by sacrificing the dynamics of persona generation.
Pollution attack inserts invalid searches to a victim’s search profile through cross-
site scripting. One crucial characteristic of such searches is that they are performed
through third party websites. As a result, we can identify possibly invalid searches
by building personas in the following ways.
Our persona generation approach first creates multiple accounts and synchronizes
the user’s search activities whenever performed. In this way, we obtain multiple copies
of a user’s profile. When identifying possibly invalid data in the user’s profile, our
persona generation approach pinpoints those searches performed through third party
websites, and creates all possible personas by removing them accordingly. Given
a search profile (T ∈ {s1, s2, · · · , si, · · · , sj, · · · }) containing 2 searches (si and sj)
performed on third party websites, for example, our approach creates three possible
personas including T − {si}, T − {sj} and T − {si, sj}. Using this approach, we
successfully create personas without ignoring the timing factor because the persona
generation follows search activity synchronization and discards unwanted searches
accordingly.
It is worth of noticing that the number of profile copies needed depends on the
amount of searches performed through third party websites. That would suggest
an exponential number of copies. As we will show later in Section 5.3, however,
users seldom perform searches through third party websites in their everyday lives,
which indicates personas are needed only when pollution attack happens. Considering
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pollution attack has not been pervasive on the Internet, we only need to create a fixed
amount of personas in practice.
4.5 Implementation
In this section, we present the design and implementation of our BobbleX as follows.
When a user executes a search query for another with his own profile (i.e., Google
history), Google search adds that query to his profile. As adding query in such a way
incurs profile contamination, we design BobbleX in a non-intrusive manner. By non-
intrusiveness, we meant BobbleX does not incur any changes to one’s search profile
when performing searches for others. To accomplish this, we modify PhantomJS [70]
- a scripted web browser that can automate web page interactions. In particular,
we augment PhantomJS with the ability to automatically access one’s Google search
profile and pause Google logging when BobbleX needs to perform searches for others.
BobbleX needs to distribute a user’s searches to other partcipants, who then use
their own Google search accounts to perform the same searches and return their
results to the user. To do this, we develop a Chrome browser extension. It passively
collects search queries and forwards them to a central server. The central server then
coordinates other participants to execute the queries contemporaneously.
To analyse search results and their landing pages, we implement BobbleX by fur-
ther extending PhantomJS. In particular, our extended PhantomJS fetches landing
pages and extracts necessary information in the background. Last but not the least,
we implement persona generation by augmenting PhantomJS with an ability to se-
lectively duplicate a user’s searches.
4.6 Evaluation
The effectiveness of BobbleX relies upon two parts - the sentiment analysis approach
and persona generation. In this section, we evaluate BobbleX by exploring the perfor-




We use two different data sets to evaluate BobbleX. One data set is used for evaluating
sentiment analysis, while the other is for examining the feasibility of our persona
generation.
To evaluate our sentiment analysis approach, we randomly sampled 1,350 Google
searches in the category of business from a large dataset collected by Bobble [91].
From a crowdsourced platform – Mechanic Turk [62], we recruit volunteers to label
the results of these searches. In particular, each search result is manually categorized
into positive, neutral or negative based on their sentiment. Eventually, we obtain a
data set including 15% results with a negative opinion, 5% results with a positve
opinion and the rest with a neutral opinion. We evenly splitted this data set into two
subsets, one half of them for classifier trainning and the rest for its testing.
To evaluate our persona generation approach, we collected 1,259,949 searches from
6,482 Google users and recorded how these searches are performed. From a public
available seach engine NerdyData [66], we also obtained a webpage corpus including
40,144,820 webpages.
4.6.2 Performance of Sentiment Analysis
We evaluate our sentiment-based classification approach by comparing it with a few
other classification approaches. We apply these approaches to categorize search results
with a negative viewpoint, and show their performance in Figure 18. As is shown
in the figure, we present their performance in a Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) plot. We observe our sentiment-based classification approach has an extremely
low false positive rate (approximately 0.02) when it remains a true positive rate of
0.8. This low false positive indicates that our BobbleX can accurately detect search
prejudice. In other words, users can rely on BobbleX to identify the biases hidden
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Classification approach (using search result and landing page)
Classification approach (using search result)
Our classification approach
Figure 18: The ROC plot of three classification approaches.
behind his or her search results.
In addition, Figure 18 shows the classification performance of two other ap-
proaches. In one approach, we build a baseline classifer. It uses the text in search
results only. As is shown in the figure, this baseline approach has lower classifcation
performance in terms of false positive and true positive rates. The reason behind this
low performance is simply that the text in search results alone only provide limited
distinguishable information for sentiment classification. To further verify this argu-
ment, we rebuild this baseline classifer. In particular, the improved classifer uses both
the text in search results and the text in their landing pages. As is shown in Figure 18,
we observe that this improved classifer shows better classification performance than
the baseline classifer. This further indicates that the information in landing pages
can be used for boosting classification performance. However, we also observe that
our sentiment-based classification approach outperforms this improved classifier. This
indicates that information in landing pages are typically noisy and removing informa-
tion nosie from landing pages can significantly improve the performance in sentiment
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(a) Classifier for positive sentiment analysis.





















(b) Classifier for neutral sentiment analysis.
Figure 19: The ROC plots of other binary classifiers.
classification.
As is mentioned in Section 4.3, we use three binary classifiers to categorize search
results into positve, neutral or negative. As a result, we also evaluate our sentiment
analysis approach per classifier. Figure 19 shows the classification performance of
the other two binary classifiers. Comparing with the classification performance for
negative sentiment analysis shown in Figure 18, we observe the other two classifers
perform in lower performance. One reason is that search results with a negative opin-
ion contain higly distinguishable words which we can use to generate distinguishable
features and benefit this classifer for negative opinion categorization. Another reason
is that the search results with neutral and positive opinions share many common
words and we cannot select highly distinguishable features from them for classifying
search results in these two opinions.
4.6.3 Feasibility of Persona Generation
As is discussed in Section 4.4, the effectiveness of persona generation relies on the
number of searches made through third party websites. Intuition suggests that our
persona generation approach may not be a feasible solution if users typically perform
many searches through third party websites. So, we evaluate our persona generation
by examining how frequent a user performs searches on third party websites and how
many webpages allow a user to perform searches through them.
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We answer these two questions by using the aforementioned large-scale data set.
Our measurement shows only 0.0367% (462 out of 1,259,949) searches are performed
through third party websites and only 0.1068% (42,888 out of 40,144,820) webpages
allow users to perform searches. These two percentages in low values indicate that
users rarely perform searches through third party websites and our persona generation
approach does not need to create many personas when pollution attack does not
happen.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce two mitigation strategies that undermine the impact
of information prejudices. We show that an effective and efficient sentiment anal-
ysis technique can facilitate information prejudice mitigation. By integtrating it
to our crowdsourcing and persona correlation strategies, the impact of information
prejudices can be significantly undermined. Though we demonstrate our mitigation
strategies on Google personalization search, they can be applied to a variety of per-
sonalization services. Our proposed mitigation strategies do not require server side





Browser extensions (or “add-ons”) have became a significant driving force behind web
browsers, often offering much needed missing functionalities to their users. Extensions
are available for all modern browsers, including Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer,
Safari and Opera, and are now beginning to appear in mobile browsers [9]. Extension
“stores” usually contain tens of thousands of different offerings, with some extensions
reaching a user base in the millions.
To monetize their work, extension developers may decide to display ads to their
users, thus producing revenue through ad impressions and clicks. Naturally, mis-
creants have found ways to heavily abuse this practice. For example, a “shady”
advertisement network may attempt to purchase a popular extension from its devel-
opers. Once the extension has been acquired, a (silent) update containing ad-injection
code can be pushed to the extension users, thus inflating (often fraudulently) the ad
revenue for the ad network [4].
One of the main challenges is that some of these extensions try to operate in the
“grey area” of extension development policies, to reduce the risk of being removed
from the extension stores while increasing their revenues. This seems to be one
of the driving factors that urged Google to update their Chrome extension policies
in December 2013, making them more strict with regards to ads [14]. According
to [6], developers are not allowed to build a Chrome extension “that requires users to
accept bundles of unrelated functionality...for example, display product ratings and
reviews, but also injects ads into web pages”. This policy implies that the ad-injection
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functionality must be implemented as a separate extension, enabling users to clearly
identify the developer’s intention and to install that functionality only with explicit
consent.
Unfortunately, with tens of thousands of extensions and a constant stream of
updates, enforcing such policies without introducing a significant delay is challenging.
Currently, extension stores (e.g., Google’s Chrome extensions store) set a low bar for
introducing new extensions, and for providing updates to existing extensions. Instead,
they adopt a crowdsourced approach, relying on their users to identify misbehaving
extensions – users can rate extensions, review them, and report abusive extensions.
For example, some of these reports recently led to the removal of extensions from the
Chrome store [13]. Similarly, there exist other third-party websites (e.g., Extension
Defender [8]) that keep track of the “reputation” of browser extensions, again relying
on users to report different types of misbehaviors.
These crowdsourced manual efforts are slow and limited, and react to violations
only after they have already affected many users. Furthermore, this process does not
scale well, as extension stores grow and are expected to expand to mobile browsers [5].
Therefore, the implications of misbehaving extensions with respect to user trust,
privacy and security may become even more severe in the near future.
An alternative solution employed by extension stores, e.g., Firefox add-ons [11], is
a rigorous process in which editors manually inspect various aspects of the extension.
The problem is that this process is extremely slow (Firefox addon approval process
can take up to 10 days [3]), and obviously it does not scale with the increase in
the number of extensions. Furthermore, as we later show, we identified ad-injecting
Chrome extensions that appear also in the FireFox add-on store, indicating that even
this rigorous process is not sufficient.
To address these issues, we introduce Expector (Extension Inspector), a system
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that automatically inspects browser extensions looking for signs of ad injection capa-
bilities. Our main goal is to quickly sift through thousands of extensions to identify
those that are most likely in violation of the advertisement practices policies set by
browser vendors. Expector operates using both static and dynamic analysis tech-
niques. It first identifies domains and events that trigger the ad injections, and then
compares the DOM structure resulting from visiting websites with and without the
analyzed extension. It identifies DOM elements introduced or altered by the extension
that is suspicious as containing ads and examines network traffic to identify patterns
associated with ad networks.
Unlike the current manual efforts, Expector is highly scalable and operates with-
out human intervention. By integrating Expector in the extension approval process,
a browser vendor can better prioritize further analysis for extensions that are sus-
pected to violate the policies. In turns, this can help to significantly improve the
quality of their extensions, and to potentially prevent abusive extensions from ever
reaching the users.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We present Expector, a novel system that automatically identifies browser ex-
tensions capable of injecting ads on webpages. Expector works by installing an
instrumented extension within a virtual browser. By correlating the network
traffic generated by the browser with changes that the extension performs over
the DOM elements of various HTML pages, Expector is able to identify various
forms of ad injection.
• Our current implementation of Expector enables the automatic analysis of
Chrome extensions. We ran Expector on all extensions (almost 18,000) avail-
able on the Chrome extension store, and identified 292 extensions that embed
ad-injection capabilities, installed and used by millions of users. Expector is
accurate, with low 3.6% false-positives and 3% false-negatives.
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• We present a detailed study of the ad-injection ecosystem from browser exten-
sions. Specifically, we select 223 very popular extensions from those identified
by Expector, and detail their behavior, malpractices, and revenue structure.
We show that by participating in various fraudulent activities, the ad networks
can generate large revenues, in par with many legitimate ad networks.
The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.1 we pro-
vide essential background and terminology. We detail the design of Expector in
Section 5.2, and show the results from applying it to the Google Chrome extension
store in Section 5.3. We then perform a detailed case study for a few popular exten-
sions identified by Expector in Section 5.4, discuss potential future improvements in
Section 5.5, related work in Section 5.6 and conclude the chapter in Section 5.7.
5.1 Background and Motivation
Browser extensions are programs that enhance the functionalities of the browser.
These programs are written in HTML, JavaScript and CSS and are hosted in online
stores like the Chrome web store [12] and Mozilla Ad-Ons store [11]. Extensions in-
teract with the current webpage loaded in the browser by injecting JavaScript to read
or modify the DOM structure of the webpage, communicating with external servers
outside of the origin using XMLHttpRequest objects, and leveraging the browser APIs
and features. The permissions requested by the extension are listed in a manifest
file that is reviewed by the user at installation time. As is evident from this de-
scription, browser extensions hold significant privileges which leaves the door open to
malpractices with security and privacy risks.
Browser extension developers often user advertising as way to monetize the “free”
extension provided on the web store. While this practice is legitimate, there has been
a growing number of incidents where extension developers abuse the privileges and
the policies of the online stores by injecting ads on webpages that users browse. These
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Figure 20: A Google search injected with ads from “Translate Selection” Chrome exten-
sion.
practices impact end-users (popup ads, intrusive and inappropriate ads), publishers
(decrease in ad revenue), and other ad-networks (ads replaced with other ads). In the
rest of the section we describe the three primary type of ad injection malpractices we
observed through our study of Chrome browser extensions.
5.1.1 Ad Injection Practices
Ad Injection on Search Result Pages. Consider the screenshot in Figure 20,
showing the result page of a Google search for the query “bags”. The user has in-
stalled the “Translate Selection” Chrome extension whose primary purpose is to help
users quickly translate the selected text between different languages. However, this
extension bundles with it the functionality to inject ads in the search results returned
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to the user. The top highlighted region in Figure 20 shows the standard Google spon-
sored ads. The bottom highlighted region shows another set of ads of bags with links
to online stores. In this case, the extension clearly violates the Chrome extension
policy as it bundles its core functionality with injecting – the Chrome policy states
that “if two pieces of functionality are clearly separate, they should be put into two
different extensions”. Furthermore, the organic search results returned by Google are
pushed further down the screen, and potentially not visible all together on smaller
screen sizes.
Ad Injection on Retail Websites. Another type of ad injection practice is related
to injecting ads on webpages related to online retail (amazon.com, ebay.com, etc.).
When a potential shopper browses a product on an online retail website, the extension
sends the context of a browsing session to a third-party advertisement service, which
retrieves similar or related products. These products are shown in the form of an ad
to the user, overlayed on the existing website content. As we shall see in Section 5.3,
these ads are injected by extensions that are not related to online shopping (e.g.
News and Weather, Sports, Developer Tools, etc.) which again violates the above
stated Google Chrome extension policy. Additionally, these extensions potentially
also impact the revenue of the online retailer by showing users ads from competing
or similar products.
Ad Injection on Unrelated Websites. The third type of ad injection practice
consists of extensions that aggressively insert ads on almost every webpage that the
user browses. This practice can often degrade the user’s experience by having ads
pop up or annoying ads. Furthermore, it can potentially reduce the ad revenue of
publishers as users may end up clicking on the injected ads or the injected ads may
be overlaid on top of the publisher’s ad slots.
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5.1.2 Ad Injection JavaScript Libraries
It is relatively straightforward for extension developers to monetize their extension
through ad injection. Similar to existing ad networks and ad exchanges, there exists
a thriving market of ad networks that provide JavaScript ad injection libraries for
extension developers to integrate with their applications. These libraries inject ads
on webpages by modifying the DOM structure of the HTML and inserting additional
HTML iframes that contain the injected ad content. The ad provider may trigger the
ad injection only on websites that are related (e.g., retail websites) and/or inject ads
when a user performs a specific operation on this websites (e.g., hover on a product
image).
5.1.3 Goal and Challenges
Our primary goal is to develop a system that automatically detects extensions that
participate in ad injection practices out of the several thousand extensions that exist
in online stores. Unlike existing approaches that rely on crowdsourced feedback and
manual code inspection approaches, we seek to reduce the extent of human inter-
vention required to analyze the ad injection practices of extensions by providing the
extension store operators sufficient insight into the ad injection practices of the ex-
tension. In some cases compliance checking can be fully automated (e.g., ads served
through invisible iframes, pop-unders or out of screen positioning), while others might
require further manual inspection (e.g., camouflaging ads in order to trick users to
click on them).
Achieving the above described goals requires addressing the following key chal-
lenges that we identified by manually inspecting a large set of extensions.
Identifying Triggering Websites As previously described, some extensions ubiq-
uitously inject ads on every website that the user visits, while others are contextual
and operate only on specific websites, e.g., Google search results. In order minimize
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the search space of possible webpages that the ad injection is triggered, it is important
for the system to directly identify the domains on which the ad injection is triggered.
Identifying Injected Ads Injected ads alter the DOM structure of the website.
Although identifying these changes is relatively easy, attributing the changes to an
extension is not trivial, mainly because websites often have some logic that changes
their DOM structure upon consecutive reloads. For example, a news website can
decide to show (or not show) a Stocks Price bar based on the time of day. Furthermore,
an extension can alter the DOM structure as part of its core functionality, which often
not ads related.
Identifying Triggering Events In order to provide better user experience, or alter-
natively, make ad injection less intrusive and detectable, some extensions are activated
based on user interactions, e.g., hovering over a product photo. This logic is encoded
in the JavaScript library or be fetched in runtime from the third-party ad network.
Our system needs to identify these triggering events, and simulate them so that the
extension performs its ad-injection functionality.
5.2 Expector Design and Implementation
In this section we present the design and implementation of Expector, a system
that can automatically detect and characterize ad injection practices used by browser
extensions. The design of Expector addresses the challenges listed earlier in a way
that enables scalable and lightweight checking of browser extensions. Expector’s
current design is able to detect a wide range of ad injection practices with high
accuracy. As we show in Section 5.3, Expector has a false positive and negative rate
of 3.6% and 3.0%, respectively. We implement Expector for the Chrome browser and
describe the implementation below.
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Figure 21: Expector design and process flow. The Expector contains four primary
components: Pre-Parser, DOM Tree Comparator, Event Trigger, and Verifier. Given an
extension, Expector determines if the extension is adware.
5.2.1 Design Overview
Figure 21 provides an overview of Expector which consists of four primary compo-
nents – Pre-Parser, DOM Tree Comparator, Event Trigger, and Verifier. Expector
operates by processing one extension at a time (though multiple instances can run
in parallel). The Pre-Parser loads the extension into a browser and extracts all the
JavaScript code that is loaded at runtime. It performs static analysis of the code
to extract the potential triggering domains. Then, Expector launches two browser
configurations; one without any extension and the another with the extension being
investigated. For both configurations, Expector loads the domains detected by the
pre-parser. After each page is fully loaded, the DOM Tree Comparator outputs a set
of DOM elements that only exist in the webpage loaded by browser with the exten-
sion installed. These DOM elements are flagged as the potential elements used by the
extension to inject ads. The Event Trigger identifies all events associated with these
elements (e.g., onClick, onMouseOver, and onMouseMove, etc.) and triggers these
events. Triggering these events could potentially result in new DOM elements being
injected. Expector clicks on every new DOM element, while the Verifier monitors all
HTTP requests made by the Event Trigger, and detects patterns that are commonly
used by ad networks. We now describe each component in detail.
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5.2.2 Pre-Parser
The primary goal of the pre-parser is to identify the potential domains that trigger the
extension to inject ads, minimizing the need for exhaustively testing many domains.
The pre-parser spawns a browser instance with the extension installed. In addition,
it installs a virtual proxy between the browser’s JavaScript engine and the extension.
Using the remote debugging protocols supported by browsers (e.g., Chrome [17]), the
virtual proxy intercepts all the function invocations related to JavaScript executions.
Once the pre-parser obtains the JavaScript code executed by the extension, it searches
for references to one of the top-10 top-level domain names [21] (e.g., .com, .net,
.org). We limit the search to these top-10 top-level domains because we assume
that extensions that are triggered by specific websites will most likely target popular
websites, almost all of which are included in the top-10 domains.
5.2.3 DOM Tree Comparator
The goal of the DOM Tree Comparator is to identify the suspicious DOM elements
that are potentially inserted by the extension for ad injection. A naive approach is
to directly compare the HTML source of two different pages – one with the extension
loaded, and another one without. However this approach will result in a large number
of false positives as most webpages load a large amount of dynamic content that can
be served by different hosts on each reload of the webpage. For example, each reload
of a webpage can potentially result in ads served from different ad providers.
To address this, the DOM tree comparator uses both the DOM structure as well
as the content of the DOM elements to identify potential elements injected elements.
This is achieved by the following steps:
1. We assume that all hosts that serve content on the webpage without the exten-
sion installed are trusted and generate a list of trusted host names by loading
the webpage multiple times without the extension.
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2. We load the webpage using two instances of the browser (with and without the
extension loaded) and record the DOM tree.
3. The DOM tree structure is flattened into a list of elements by performing a
pre-order traversal over the corresponding DOM tree, i.e., for each node in
the list, its descendants are located at its right side and its ancestors are at
the left side of the node. Each item in the list consists of the tag name of
the DOM element and the domain associated with the DOM element (if such
domain exists). For example, an iframe tag like <iframe src=‘http://www.
amazon.com/product/B00BWYQ9YE/’/> is encoded as a two tuple (‘iframe’,
‘www.amazon.com’) after transformation.
4. In order to compute the difference between the two lists, we used a variant of
the longest common subsequence (LCS) problem algorithm, which is used by
the well-known diff command. The modified LCS algorithm outputs nodes
that are present only in the webpage loaded with the extension installed.
5. Finally, these elements are further processed and only the elements whose host
name is not presented in the trusted list are used as input to the event trigger
component.
Overall, we find that the above process yields very few false positive and false
negative and enables us to identify DOM elements that are only added by the exten-
sion. The one caveat for this process is that we cannot identify DOM elements that
are dynamically generated, e.g., create an iframe containing ads and inject it to the
DOM only after the user hovers on a product photo. However, in our experiments we
did not find extensions that use this behavior, probably since dynamically creating
elements upon user interactions might create a visual lag, whereas simply having the




The primary goal of the event trigger is to visit the ad landing pages potentially
associated with the identified DOM elements through redirects. To this end, the event
trigger process the suspicious DOM elements as follows. For all DOM elements that
have a JavaScript event handler to process user events, like onClick, onMouseOver,
etc., we instruct the browser to execute the corresponding JavaScript function. For
all events that have a URL associated with the DOM element, we instruct the browser
to visit the URL. Note that we ignore iframes as the URL points to the source of the
iframe. Finally, for all the remaining elements (elements with no URLs or iframes),
we instruct the browser to trigger a click event to emulate a user clicking inside the
element. For all the above cases, if the element contains an ad, the advertiser’s website
will be loaded usually through a series of redirects, first to one or more ad networks
and then to the ad landing page.
A caveat to the above described event trigger mechanism is that some extensions
inject ads only after some time has elapsed since the user installed the extension.
We assume these practices are used to reduce user dissatisfaction from the injected
ads. We manually inspected these extensions and found that they mostly retrieve
timing information using the system APIs. We therefore “tricked” these extensions
by setting the system clock before we install an extension to one year backwards, then
install the extension, launch the browser and then set the system clock to one day in
the future.
5.2.5 Verifier
Finally, the verifier validates that the triggered DOM elements are indeed associated
with ads. A unique characteristic of an ad element is that after an ad is clicked
there is a redirection pattern, oftentimes to multiple websites. These redirections
enable ad networks to monitor ad clicking for analytics and billing purposes. This
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redirection pattern is unique to ads and simply detecting it is sufficient to identify
that the corresponding DOM element injects ads.
To detect such redirection patterns, we implemented a lightweight Chrome exten-
sion, which is loaded before the extension is installed, that logs all HTTP requests
made by the browser. HTTP requests issued as a result of the Event Trigger actions
are analyzed by the verifier which searches for redirections. A redirection is detected
when an event results in more than one domain in the traffic trace, and the last
domain (e.g., the ad landing page) is not the same as the original web site (i.e., the
one that contains the DOM element). If such redirection is identified, the extension
is marked as an adware.
5.2.6 Implementation
We implement Expector using Node.js [15] and Selenium [19], a tool that enables
browser automation (the entire setup is executed without human intervention). We
use Node.js to spawn a Chrome instance and load a Chrome extension for pre-parsing.
Using the remote debugging protocol of Chrome, we configure a virtual proxy working
as a Chrome Developer Tool that intercepts all the JavaScript function invocations.
Specifically, we listen on all Debugger.scriptParsed events and log all the JavaScript
code parsed by the V8 JavaScript engine. The rest of the components of Expector
are implemented with Selenium and the LCS algorithm is implemented in Python.
To ensure fast and scalable processing of a large number of Chrome extensions,
we deploy Expector across 60 Linux Debian 7 virtual machines running on a 32 core
server with 128 GB RAM. This setup enabled us to process all 18,030 extensions in
the Chrome webstore in less than three days.
5.3 Evaluation
In this section, we provide a detailed evaluation of Expector. We evaluate the ac-


















































































































Figure 22: The distribution of Chrome extensions across different categories. All Exten-
sions span the 18,030 extensions we crawled from the Chrome store, and Adware span the
292 extensions identified as adware by Expector.
false positive and negative rates using two different datasets. Using metadata asso-
ciated with the extensions, we further characterize the ad networks and extension
developers that publish such extensions. Finally, we discuss the adware takedown
strategy that Google probably relies upon.
5.3.1 Datasets
Dataset to characterize false positives. We evaluate the false positive rate of
Expector by testing all the available extensions on the Chrome web store followed
by manual verification. To this end, we developed a crawler that downloads all ex-
tensions that are listed on the Chrome Web Store [12] along with the extension’s
meta data, i.e., developer account, extension category, number of active users, rating,
description, and user reviews. We ran our crawler during March 2014, and obtained
18,030 Chrome extensions. Figure 22 shows the distribution of these Chrome exten-
sions across different categories, with the top three categories being “Productivity”,
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“Social & Communication and “Fun”.
Dataset to characterize false negatives. In order to study the false negative
rate of Expector we use a crowdsourced list of Chrome extensions that are tagged
as adware. This list is provided by Extension Defender [1] that enables users to
submit extensions as potential adware which are reviewed and verified manually by
the curators of this list. In March 2014, this Extension Defender had 78 Chrome
extensions that were tagged as adware.
5.3.2 False Positives
Out of the 18,030 extensions downloaded from the Chrome web store, 108 extensions
(0.6%) failed to be processed by Expector. By inspecting the code of these extensions
we found that these extensions utilize native binary code [18] that was not ported
by the extension developer to Linux. All other 17,922 extensions were successfully
evaluated by Expector using the setup within three days highlighting the ability of
Expector to scale to a large number of extensions.
Expector reported 303 extensions as adware, which accounts for 1.7% extensions
on Google Chrome store. We manually installed each of these and inspected their
source code, and found that 292 of these are indeed adware. This indicates a very
low false positive rate of 3.6%. We further analyzed the 11 extensions that Expector
incorrectly identified and find that Expector flagged them as users were re-directed
to webpages controlled by the extension developer that contained ads. For example,
parental control extensions like Anti-Porn Pro and No Xvideos maintain a blacklist
of websites. When users navigate to these webpages, the extension re-directs the
user to a webpage hosted by the extension developer showing a warning message.




We begin the analysis of false negative rate by first manually verifying the crowd-
sourced list of extensions tagged as adware. Surprisingly, we find that out of the 78
extensions only 34 of them were manually verified as adware. This initial analysis
highlights the limitations of the crowdsourced approach where curators cannot man-
ually check every update to the extension source code and verify user complaints.
Consequently, we postulate that these 44 extensions may have disabled the ad in-
jection functionality after being flagged as adware, and Extension Defender failed to
remove them from their list.
Out of the 34 manually verified adware extensions, Expector was able to correctly
detect 32 of these. We further analyzed the two extensions that Expector missed.
The first one uses a Windows DLL file, which is not compatible on Linux, but could
have been processed if Expector was deployed on Windows. We do not count this
as a false negative. The second extension operates on Facebook, and uses a more
sophisticated triggering method. It requires the user to visit Facebook.com, scroll to
the bottom of the page, and wait for a 10 seconds before injecting ads. Expector
correctly identified the triggering website and the timeout event, but failed detecting
the scroll event. These complex triggering events are difficult to identify, however, as
our analysis shows, they are quite rare as they target a very specific user interaction,
thus reducing the number of ads the extension injects (and lowering their revenue).
Consequently, Expector has a low false negative rate of 3.0% (1/33).
5.3.4 Deploying Expector
Expector identified 292 adware extensions in the Chrome store, which is notably
higher (9×) than the crowd-sourced approach used by Extension Defender. Consid-
ering a 3% false negative rate, deploying Expector in the online approval process of
uploading extensions to the webstore will almost mitigate adware from entering the
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Table 1: The top-10 adware developers.
Chrome webstore, thereby greatly improving its quality, while incorrectly rejecting
only 3.6% of the submitted extensions. Developers of these incorrectly flagged ex-
tensions can appeal and request a manual verification, requiring a small amount of
human intervention by the webstore operators.
5.3.5 Characterizing Adware
In this section we characterize the 292 adware that our system correctly reports
to understand their category distribution, developers authoring such extensions and
usage of ad networks.
Extension Categories. Intuitively, we expect the adware extensions to belong to
the “Shopping” category in order minimize the risk of violating Google’s policies that
prohibits the bundling of different functionalities. For example, a shopping related
extension could potentially inject ads on webpages with the goal of improving the
user’s online shopping experience. Figure 22 shows the fraction of all extensions and
adware extensions in each category. Surprisingly, we find that only 14% of the adware
extensions are categorized as “Shopping”. The remaining span different categories,
with “Sports” holding the largest percentage of adware (40% of the extensions we
identified as adware).
Adware Developers. We study the developers of the adware extensions. Overall,
75











Table 2: The top-10 ad networks that adware contact.








Table 3: The distribution of adware across the number of network domains that they
contact.
there are 11,738 distinct developers that publish extensions on the Chrome store.
Out of these, 118 are developers of one or more of the 292 adware extensions. Only
16 of them (13.6%) publish more than one adware extension (determined by the de-
veloper ids). Table 1 shows the top 10 developers of adware along with the number
of extensions that are flagged as adware. We observe that not all of the developer’s
extensions are adware. This is because, ad networks for extensions require a min-
imum number of users to actively use the extension (e.g., superfish.com requires
a minimum of 50,000 active users) and not all the developer’s extensions may have
these many active users. This effectively makes it difficult for the webstore operators
to directly ban the developer as not all the extensions may be adware.
Ad Networks. In order to study the ad networks used to deliver ads, we processed
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the network logs stored by the Verifier module, and extracted the domains used by
adware for fetching ads. We found 67 unique ad network (domains) in total. We
further want to assess the user-base of each ad network, i.e., how many users each
ad networks serves ads to. We use the following simple heuristic that provides a
conservative estimate of the number of users; among all the adware extensions that
fetch ads from a given ad network domain, we assign the ad-network the maximum
user-base among these extensions (making the assumption that all users overlap).
Table 2 shows the top-10 ad networks that adware contact. We observe that a majority
of the ad networks are used by multiple extensions, with superfish.com and yandex.ru
leading with 199 and 147 adware extensions, respectively. Finally, Table 3 shows the
number of ad networks used by adware. The table shows that more than 50% of the
adware contact at least three ad networks, the vast majority (145 extensions) contact
four networks, and one extension, TrustedShopper, partners with 6 different networks.
We attribute this to the developers’ attempt to maximize their financial gains and
reduce their reliance on a single ad network.
5.3.5.1 Extension Removal
We now characterize the extent to which Google purges adware extensions from the
webstore. We crawled the Chrome store again in May 2014 (roughly 6 weeks after our
initial crawl), and checked the availability of the adware identified by Expector. We
found that out of the 292 adware detected only 33 (11.3%) are no longer available for
download (see Table 4). Finding the root cause behind these extension removals is
not trivial – the extensions may have been removed by the developer or Google could
have removed these extensions due to policy violations related to ad injection or other
malicious activity. By manually verifying these extensions we do not find any explicit
malicious behavior. We also observed that 15 of the 33 extensions belonged to the
same developer. Given these observations we hypothesize that these extensions likely
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Table 4: 33 Chrome extensions that Google took down due to ad injection bundle.
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violated Google’s policies related to ad injection.
In addition to the above analysis, we uploaded an extension to the Chrome store
that contains almost the same code as one of the extensions that were taken down by
Google that performed ad injection – NASA. Though we reported our uploaded ex-
tension to Google on 10 May, at the time of the writing this extension is still available
for download on Chrome store. Overall, this further implies that the current manual
approach to identify adware is not sufficient, resulting in many adware extensions and
developers that fraudulently generate ad revenue.
5.4 Case Studies
In this section, we seek to characterize the ad metrics (CTR and number of impres-
sions) of the ad networks that deliver ads to adware extensions. As shown in Sec-
tion 5.3, these ad networks are not among the major ad networks (e.g., DoubleClick,
Yahoo!, etc.) and hence not well studied. We focus on 4 popular ad networks that were
contacted by 223 extensions identified as adware by Expector– i.txtsrving.info,
superfish.com, imgclck.com and xtensionplus.com.
5.4.1 Dataset
In order to perform this study we use two datasets provided to us by a large ISP,
a security company and two universities, all of which monitor their users’ network
traffic.
HTTP Traffic. We collected the HTTP traffic log of tens of thousands of users from
two university networks and tens of enterprises. For each request we obtained the
source and destination IP address, and the complete HTTP request header including
the user’s cookie identifier (if present), requested URL path and referer. This dataset
spans 2 weeks in April 2014.
DNS Traffic. A large ISP provided us the DNS queries performed during 2 weeks
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Ad Network Request pattern Request type Affiliate ID User
field identifier
TxtSrving
cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/loader/...pid=... fetch ad pid Cookie
i.txtsrving.info/kwdu?...subid=... fetch ad subid Cookie
p.txtsrving.info/click?..subid=... click subid Cookie
SuperFish www.superfish.com/ws/findByUrl.action?...userid=...dlsource=... fetch ad dlsource useridwww.superfish.com/ws/offerURL.action?...userid=...dlsource=... click dlsource userid
ImgClck www.imgclck.com/supp0rt/www/delivery/afr.php?...&beacon=... fetch ad beacon Cookie
XtensionPlus xtensionplus.com/display.htm?...&pi=... fetch ad pi Cookie
Table 5: The HTTP request patterns originated from adware for each ad network. The
table shows the purpose of the request (fetch an ad or report that a user clicked on an ad),
the field used to identify the affiliate (adware), and the method used by the ad network to
track the user.
in April 2014 against the domains of the 4 ad-networks we study. The DNS traffic
log contains A-type DNS records from around 20 million daily users located in the
US. Each DNS query contains the IP address of the requesting host (user) and the
requested domain. We note that the ISP has a very low DHCP churn rate on a daily
basis, thus it is very unlikely that a single host will have more than a single IP on a
daily basis.
Mapping Adware to Traffic Logs. Our first task is to associate the traffic logs to
specific adware extensions. To this end, we need to identify the URL patterns issued
by the extensions we study, and locate these patterns in the traffic logs.
We identify patterns in the URLs that each adware generates by inspecting the
source code, and extract the affiliate IDs which are unique IDs issued by the ad
networks to their customers. Table 5 lists some of the traffic patterns used by the
adware extensions, along with the fields we use to identify the affiliate IDs (leading
us to the corresponding adware) contained in the HTTP requests. Additionally, the
Table also shows the method used to associate unique users to the requests. Using
these patterns, we filtered our datasets to only include traffic that matches the adware
we study. To further validate that these requests originate from the adware and not
from users visiting pages that make similar requests to the ad networks, we inspected
the HTTP referrer field and found that none of the referres were from the domains
that adware contacts. This implies that the requests are generated by the adware
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www.imgclck.com xtensionplus.com superfish.com txtsrving.info
% of IPs 0.003 0.017 0.168 0.008
Total ad requests 22,935 3,983 9,741 2,342
Avg Daily requests / user 102.30 54.71 8.19 8.44
Table 6: Statistics regarding the four domains used by adware for ad injections, showing
the percentage of unique IPs (out of the 20 million IPs in the DNS dataset) that resolve
each domain, the total ad requests and the average daily ad requests per user from each
domain in the HTTP dataset.
extensions rather than other user browsing activity.
In order to draw broader conclusions on the reach of these ad networks, i.e.,
number of users they serve, we correlate the IP address of hosts that contact ad
networks in the HTTP dataset with the DNS logs. We found that all enterprise IP
addresses that exhibit adware network patterns in the HTTP dataset also appear to
query the ad networks domains in the DNS logs (the university hosts use a different
DNS server). Together with the observation that these domains do not serve any
regular content, leads us to believe that DNS queries to these 4 ad networks is indeed
the result of an adware and not a user explicitly visiting their domain. This enables
us to use the large DNS logs and estimate the user-base of these ad networks.
5.4.2 Click Stealing
We first study the adware extensions that contact the ad network txtsrving.info
for fetching ads. As shown in Table 2, we identified 11 such adware, the most popular
of which has 594,565 active users. TxtSrving injects ads into a page by adding <a>
tags to various text elements in the original HTML. These tags are used as hyperlinks,
usually placed in pages to connect it with other relevant content. However, TxtSrving
connects the text with their ads, so an unwary user that clicks on the links, probably
expecting some related content, actually clicks on an ad. This form of ad injection
can be seen as a “click stealing”, essentially tricking users into clicking ads despite
lack of intent [37], potentially leading to a clickthrough that is substantially higher
than that obtained by more legitimate practices.
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To further study the clickthrough rate of such ads, we measured the number of ad
requests made to the domain txtsrving.info. As shown in Table 6, we identified
2,342 distinct ad requests, all originating from 11 different extensions (identified by
their unique affiliate IDs). Out of these, we found 149 clicks on injected ads (identified
by an HTTP request to the domain of the ad with the referrer being the ad network).
This yields a 6.36% clickthrough rate, which is significantly higher than the average
0.22% clickthrough rate reported by Google’s Double Click [7].
5.4.3 Impression Fraud
Next, we study the adware that serve ads delivered from xtensionplus.com. These
adware fetch ads and display them in 13 invisible iframes every time a user visits a
page. This kind of injection strategy is a clear form of impression fraud [79], essentially
causing advertisers to pay for ads that were never seen by real users.
As shown in Table 6, we found 3,983 ad requests to xtensionplus.com, 3,701
(91%) of which originate from Chrome browsers and the rest from Firefox, all using
3 unique affiliate IDs.
5.4.4 Additional Ad Injection Practices
Finally, we discuss two examples of adware that seem to violate extension policies
in a more subtle ways. While we may not have enough evidence to categorize the
ad injection practices of these extensions as clearly fraudulent, they do present some
“shady” traits that we believe are worth highlighting.
5.4.4.1 www.imgclck.com
Extensions that use ImgClck www.imgclck.com typically place a banner ad at the
bottom of a user page. Many webpages are very long and oftentimes implement some
method of “infinite” scroll (e.g., Facebook, Pinterest, etc.), therefore a user might
never really reach the bottom of the page [20]. This means that an ad positioned in
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Regions CPC Internet users
US & Canada $0.22 284,056,300
UK, FR, Germany $0.16 177,631,638






Australia, New Zealand $0.12 22,003,709
Table 7: Superfish cost per click per geographic region and the corresponding Internet
user population.
Chrome Firefox IE Safari Total
Ad display 4,169 4,700 861 11 9,741
Affiliate ids 56 37 27 3 76
User ids 264 187 85 7 543
Table 8: Statistics of observed traffic to superfish.com across 4 browsers.
the bottom of the page is counted as an impression, but might never be seen by a real
user, thus might also be considered a type of impression fraud. As shown in Table 2,
there are 14 adware contacting domain www.imgclck.com, the most popular of them
being used by 344,821 users.
Although positioning a banner in the bottom of a page is not necessarily fraud-
ulent, we found that ImgClck embeds DoubleClick ads into the iframe they provide
to the extension. The iframe with the DoubleClick ads is then injected to arbitrary
pages, which is in direct violation to DoubleClick’s policy that strictly prohibit placing
ads by anyone other than the page owner [2].
5.4.4.2 superfish.com
Superfish is an ad-network that shows ads for products based on visual similarity to
other products. Extension developers use them on e-commerce websites (e.g., Amazon.
com and eBay.com), so that users that shop for a product get ads to similar-looking
products. Superfish styles the ads so that they blend well with various websites.
Figure. 20 shows an example of Superfish ads injected into Google search result,
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Browsers # of overlapped affiliate ids
Chrome & Firefox 22
Chrome & IE 20
Chrome & Safari 2
Chrome & Firefox & IE 18
All 4 browsers 1
Table 9: Superfish affiliate overlap between Chrome and other browsers.
when the user issues a search for women handbags. As shown in Table 2, we identified
199 adware that use Superfish to display ads, with the most popular extension being
used by 1,235,379 users. Using our DNS dataset, we found that roughly 0.2% of
the 20 million unique IP addresses resolve superfish.com. Similar to the other ad
network domains, this domain has no content to offer to regular Internet users and
there is a one-to-one mapping between adware and DNS traffic, thus we assume that
these DNS queries can be attributed to adware extensions.
Since Superfish is a popular provider of ads, we seek to estimate the revenue it
generates from delivering ads to extensions. Using our HTTP traffic dataset, we
found 9,741 requests to fetch ads from superfish.com, issued by 543 distinct users.
Of the 9,741 ad injections, 107 were clicked, implying a clickthrough rate of 1.098%
(not as high as the click fraud performed by TxtSrving, but still significantly higher
than DoubleClick’s). We found 76 unique affiliate IDs from these requests, and out
of those originating from Chrome browsers, we found 56 affiliate IDs that are present
in the source code of the adware identified by Expector. Table 8 and 9 summarize
our findings.
Table 6 shows the number of unique IP addresses resolving the domain superfish.
com, and our user-base estimates of the adware that uses Superfish. Using these esti-
mates and the aforementioned data, we can estimate the annual revenue of Superfish-
based adware. We contacted Superfish and obtained their CPC rates, which are pre-
sented in Table 7. We limit our estimates to the Internet population that reside in the
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regions for which we have CPC data. Using the HTTP requests to superfish.com,
we estimate that on a daily average, 19.69% of the 543 users we identified receive on
average 8.19 ads from Superfish. Overall, based on the above DNS dataset analysis,
assuming that 0.2% of each region’s Internet population is using an extension with
Superfish ads, we estimate that the total annual amount Superfish pays to the adware
developers is approximately $1.5 million.
This indicates that although we are only able to ballpark the revenue adware
developers make from ad networks like Superfish, we find that this practice is indeed
prevalent and fosters a large and profitable ecosystem of ad networks and extension
developers.
5.5 Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, Expector is the first system that automatically detects
browser extensions that utilize ad injections. As most other automated detection
systems, Expector has some limitations, which we discuss below along with possible
directions for future work.
Native Code. Extension developers that want to improve the performance of their
code, or hide specific implementation details, can use the NPAPI to embed native
code into their extensions. In our current implementation, Expector runs on Linux,
therefore extensions that use native code for non-Linux OSes cannot be executed.
However, note that due to portability concerns NPAPI is being phased out [16],
which will not impact Expector in the long run.
Evading Detection. Once a tool like Expector is adopted, adware developers may
use various evasion techniques to avoid being detected. These practices are already
used by malware, for example to detect dynamic analysis environments [24]. Simi-
larly, we showed in Section 5.3 that an adware targeting Facebook evades automated
detection by requiring complex user interaction. Obviously, Expector will have to
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evolve and keep track of these evasion techniques.
Obfuscation. Expector analyzes the JavaScript code of an extension to extract the
domain names that trigger the adware. Therefore, adware developers may obfuscate
their JavaScript code to prevent detection. However, since the end-goal of adware
developers is to maximize their revenue, most of these extensions operate on popular
websites. Therefore, an alternative approach to our Pre-Parser, is to exhaustively try
a large list of popular websites, and see if any of these triggers the extension. All of
the adware we studied, either operated on all websites, or were triggered in extremely
popular websites, such as Google, Amazon and Facebook.
Replacing Publisher IDs. Expector operates by looking for DOM changes intro-
duced by an extension. Therefore, a sophisticated adware can detect DOM elements
with existing tags and change the publisher ID into their own publisher ID, thereby
diverting the profits from the original publisher to themselves. However, such a trick
is difficult to implement and easily detected by the ad networks themselves (mismatch
between the referred domain and the publisher ID).
5.6 Related Work
In this section, we discuss three lines of work most related to ours – (1) adware
analysis, (2) detection of malicious JavaScript, and (3) detection and mitigation of
malicious browser extensions.
Adware. Edelman et al. [42] provide an overview of the adware ecosystem, study-
ing the ad networks, exchanges, and practices used by ad injectors. In a more recent
work [43], the same authors study fraud in online affiliate marketing, and how ad-
ware takes part of such frauds. Both works focus more on the business aspects of the
ecosystem, and unlike our work, they do not attempt to provide a system for auto-
matic detection of adware, but instead extract the participants of manually selected
adware extensions.
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Several tools have been recently developed to assist users remove adware from
Chrome [8, 10]. These tools operate by comparing extensions installed by a user
against a list, oftentimes crowd-sourced, of known adware, and alerting the user if
such extensions are found. Such detection approach is limited by the accuracy and
completeness of its list, and cannot handle new adware that was not yet reported.
Expector does not rely on manually curated lists, making it highly suitable for ana-
lyzing extensions in the approval process, before they ever reach users.
Malicious JavaScript Detection. Several works proposed generic methods for
detecting of malicious code [26,26,35,39,40]. Chugh et al. [35] present an information
flow based approach for inferring the impact that the JavaScript code has on the
website, using both static and dynamic analysis.. In [26], the authors introduce VEX,
a framework that performs static taint analysis to track explicit leaks resulting from
potential privilege escalations in browser extensions. A different form of static analysis
was recently proposed by Kashyap and Hardekopf [52] for creating security signatures
of extensions, which describe the usage of critical APIs and information flows of an
extension. A recent dynamic information flow analysis was presented by Bichhawat et
al. [30], tracking both explicit data and implicit control flows of JavaScript bytecode
in WebKit with moderate overheads.
Despite great improvements of JavaScript code analysis, adware typically do not
use sensitive APIs or specific coding practices, thus simple ad-hoc methods, such as
those used by Expector, are likely to be more suited to the problem domain.
Browser Extension. A series of security issues in browser extensions have been
studied for years, mostly focusing on preventing user data leakage through malicious
extensions [44,53,54,57,84] and protecting against privilege abuse of extensions [47].
The security model of Chrome extensions was criticized in [57]. The authors showed
that extensions introduce attacks on the Chrome browser itself, and proposed a en-
forcing micro-privileges at the DOM element level. Egele et al. [44, 53] proposed
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several detection solutions to spyware that silently steals user information. By lever-
aging both static and dynamic analysis techniques the authors show that it is possible
to track the flow of sensitive information as it is processed by the web browser and
any extension installed. [47] showed that many Chrome extensions are over-privileged,
which can potentially cause security risks. To address the shortcomings of existing
extension mechanisms, the authors propose a comprehensive new model for extension
security.
Although the security model of browsers with respect to extensions has improved
over the years, creating a security model that mitigates adware while maintaining a
decent user experience is extremely difficult. This is mostly because adware do not
typically require more privileges than other non-adware extensions, namely accessing
the DOM of visited pages and network access. In addition, adware often start as a
non-adware extension, and then, when the user-base is sufficiently large morph into
adware. Enforcing fine-grained control on every update is doable, but will significantly
hurt user experience of the vast majority of non-adware extensions.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we present Expector, a system that automatically inspects and iden-
tifies browser extensions that perform ad injection. We implemented Expector for
Chrome, ran it on the entire 17,931 extensions in the Chrome store and identified
292 extensions that inject ads, a detection rate that significantly outperforms the
current crowd-sourced detection process. Through rigorous evaluation, we found that
Expector is capable of identifying various forms of ad injection practices with low
3.6% false positive rate and 3% false negative rate. Using an indepth study of the
practices employed by the ad injecting extensions we detected, we found that many
of these extensions violate the browser policies, participate in fraudulent activities
and abuse their users’ trust. As part of future work we plan on extending Expector
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beyond Chrome, so that it can process extensions of other popular browsers. Fur-
thermore, our study lays the foundations to analyze web apps, which are very similar




CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This thesis explores information manipulation in the context of the Internet. It shows
that, with the advent of new services and technologies, Internet-scale information
manipulation has been pervasive and rampant. Motivated by this finding, the thesis
further introduces some technical approaches that help users raise awareness about
information manipulation and – more important – undermine their pernicious effects.
This thesis is pioneering research about information manipulation in the context of
the Internet. In addition to the proposed technologies that empower users against ad-
versarial information manipuluation, my findings have been guiding service providers
to revamp their services for better defending against malicious information control.
The information manipulation schemes discussed in the thesis represent only the
tip of the iceberg. As emerging technologies spread both online and offline, a in-
creasing number of manipulators would add a growing list of attempts to misuse
or exploit the mechanisms and algorithms underlying new technologies regardless of
their intents. For example, the availability of Internet-connected telematics devices
has brought personalization into traditional automobile insurance industry, where
mainstream insurers use a telematics device to track driving habits of people and
customize their insurance rates. Intuition suggests presenting low-risk driving habits
to an insurance provider would allow a customer to enjoy significant saving on in-
surance. As a result, it is highly likely that car insurance providers become the
next target of manipulators who attempts to tamper with driving habits and deceive
insurers with the goal of exchanging potential savings on insurance.
To cope with unforeseen manipulation, in the future, there is a need for developing
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new detection and mitigation solutions. The nature of information manipulation is
that, attackers compromise the integrity of data that end users or service providers
consume. As a result, future efforts may focus on developing a variety of sophisticated
mitigation solutions to verify data integrity. One possible solution is to correlate those
vulnerable data points with additional data that end users or service providers cannot
directly consume but can leverge to assess data integrity. Take the manipulation of
car insurance rates for example. Insurers may integrate additional sensors – such as
MEMS gyroscope and accelerometers – to their telematics devices for the purpose of
gathering additional data that attackers cannot easily falsify. Although sensing data
are typically too noisy to divine driving habits, insurers may use them to assess the
validity of other data items.
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